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ABSTRACT 
 In the scholarship concerning conversion to Islam in the West, few books or 
articles have been written that examine non-African American US converts.  
Furthermore, this literature generally neglects using models of conversion for analyzing 
US Muslims.  This thesis is an attempt to begin such a project.  For this thesis, I 
interviewed 13 converts to Islam over the course of a month and a half at a local mosque: 
8 females and 5 males; 9 white, 3 Latina/o, and 1 non-African American black.  These 
converts told me their stories of conversion: beginning with their life prior to conversion, 
the process leading up to conversion, the conversion experience, and the events that took 
place after their conversion.  In this thesis I compare their responses with other studies of 
non-African American converts in the West.  While these converts share many 
similarities with their European counterparts, there are 4 prominent differences: the 
Denver converts, on the whole, had religious upbringings; most have moved several 
times throughout their lives; European converts tended to have higher education levels; 
and Denver converts are far less attracted to intellectual aspects of Islam, while being 
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 The phenomenon of conversion to Islam in contemporary Europe and America is 
representative of many important issues in the academy and in politics: race, religion, 
pluralism, Islam, globalization, and of course, terrorism1—social constructs that have 
played a crucial role throughout US history, but are now increasingly given prominence 
due to current political situations.  Until the last 8 years, however, modern Western 
conversion to Islam, particularly by non-African Americans, has received littl  attention 
from academics.   
 Two thousand eight marked the 30 year anniversary of the first sociological study 
of non-African American converts to Islam in the contemporary West.  Nafees-El Batool 
Khan’s 4-page article observed, among other things, the now well-known pre-condition 
                                                          
1
 However, the conversion of Americans into terrorist organizations will not be covered in depth in this 
thesis.  Here are some findings: Based on the storie  f the converts we know about, they are generally 
white and young (average age 18.33), save for one of the most notorious, Jose Padilla, who is of Puerto 
Rican descent. These individuals typically are attrac ed to mainline Sunni Islam after being disenchanted 
with US culture.  While attending a mosque they are approached by a small group of Muslim men who 
explain to the convert that “true” Muslims fight to help their Muslim brothers against their enemies.  It is 
unknown how many US converts have actually joined these Muslim fighters. John Walker Lindh: 16, 
Evelyn Nieves, “A Nation Challenged: The American Fighter,” New York Times, 4 December 2001; Jose 
Padilla: 23, Deborah Sontag, “Terror Suspect’s Path from Streets to Brig,” New York Times, 25 April 2004; 
Aukai Collins: 18, Aukai Collins, My Jihad, (Guillford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2002); Adam Gadahn: 16, 
Amy Argetsinger, “Muslim Teen Made Conversion to Fury—Intelligence Sources Say Californian Was on 
Tape,” Washington Post, 2 December 2004; Abu Hamid: 16, Colin Soloway, “Tale of an American 
Taliban,” Newsweek, 138, no. 24 (2001): 34; Ryan G. Anderson: 21, Michael Janofsky, “Soldier is Facing 
Charges of Trying to Aid Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 13 February 2004.  
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for conversion of not having a strong religious upbringing.2  After this brief report, there 
was little, if any, scholarly attention paid to non-African American converts in he 
modern West until Poston’s 1992 book Islamic Da’wah in the West.3  Since 1992, 
however, scholars have shown much more interest, particularly after 9/11 and the arrest 
of John Walker Lindh.  According to the Library of Congress, there have been 12 English 
language books published on that subject since 2001 compared to 9 books from all 
previous years.4  Academic journals, newspapers and magazines have seen an even more 
dramatic surge in their publications on US non-African American converts.5  While 
newspapers and magazines have focused mainly on US converts who have joined 
terrorist organizations, the percentage of converts who actually turn to terrorism remains 
only a small fraction of all US converts.6  At the same time, though, conversion to Islam 
significantly increased since 9/11.  One report estimates 34,000 Americans converted in 
the months following the attack; another estimates 200,000 US citizens convert to Islam 
every year.7  Because of the difficulty of interviewing converts, any accurate number will 
                                                          
2 Nafees-El Batool Kahn, “The Phenomenon of Conversion,” The Bulletin of Christian Institutes of Islamic 
Studies 1, no. 3 (1978): 46. 
3 Larry Poston, Islamic Da’wah in the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
4 Call number BP 170.5 
5 A search on Academic Search Premier for “Islam and Conversion” produces 346 results with 219 dated 
after 9/11. 
6 Based off a perusal of the results found in note 5. 
7 From a CAIR report.  Cited in Brendan Bernhard, White Muslim: From LA to New York…To Jihad? 
(Hoboken, New Jersey: Melville House Publishing, 2006), 14; “NBC NEWS: 20000 Americans Convert 
To ISLAM Each Year, 75% Of Them Women,” September 9, 2008, http://video.msn.com/?mkt=en-
us&brand=msnbc&fg=email&vid=1151784d-66c1-4310-afc2-06ed464eb2ed&from=00 (accessed January 
29, 2009).  There is some question as to the reliability of these numbers, particularly if they are simply 
repeating the estimates of Muslim leaders who may desire to inflate numbers to make their religion seem 
more important.  
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be hard to acquire, but the trend of increased conversion has been noted in several 
places.8   
 Within the last 30 years, however, relatively little academic reseach has been 
conducted to examine converts in the US. The literature dealing with the US is typically 
limited to converts’ testimonies whereas models for conversion are not applied.   Overall, 
most of the existing conversion literature deals with European converts, especially those 
in England.  That research will indeed be helpful to provide analysis for future studies of 
conversion to Islam in the US, but that help will be somewhat limited because of the 
qualitative differences between the US and European converts and the Muslim 
communities into which they convert.  In England, for example, there is a large and well-
established convert community which is generally composed of Caribbean blacks and 
well-educated whites.  These converts are frequently introduced to Islam by 
acquaintances of South Asian heritage.  In the US, on the other hand, there is a thriving 
African American convert community, while the white and Latino converts are not as 
well organized, and the growth of these US convert communities has been quite different 
from those in Europe.  These differences have given US converts distinct experiences that 
cannot be accurately understood by using only the results acquired in the study of 
Europeans.  Furthermore, as the body of literature on conversion to Islam has grown, the 
inevitable result has been theories and analyses becoming increasingly diverse.  With 
                                                          
8 Difficulty in interviewing converts after 9/11 was noted in Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy 
Meet (NY: Palgrave, 2004), 10; Others who have noted th increased rate of conversion: Bernhard, 14; 
Kate Zebiri, British Muslim Converts: Choosing Alternative Lives (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 214; Craig S. 
Smith, “Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover for Extremism,” New York Times 19 July 2004; 
Karin van Nieuwkerk, “Gender and Conversion to Islam in the West,” in Women Embracing Islam, ed. 
Karin van Nieuwkerk (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 1; Hisham Aidi, “Let Us be Moors: Islam, 
Race and ‘Connected Histories,’” Middle East Report 229 (2003): 43. 
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these issues in mind, this thesis has two purposes: A. It assesses the progress of 30 years 
of the study of conversion of non-African Americans to Islam in the contemporary West 
(chapter 1).  B. It takes this work as a foundation which will be used to analyze the 
conversion experiences of 13 converts in Colorado who convert for different reasons than 
their European counterparts (chapters 2-4).  Because of time, scheduling, and financial 
constraints which prohibited me from interviewing several non-convert Muslims for this 
study, the thesis aims at primarily looking at the experiences and motives of the converts, 
as reported by them.  This method, of course, has its limitations which will be addresse  
in chapter 4.  However, I should also point out here that because of these limitations, I am 
also not able to go in depth into what kind of Islam these converts practice.  That type of 
analysis would require a very thorough understanding of the specific trends in the local 
community, and to get that info I would need to conduct an expansive and long-term 
ethnographic study.  While it is an important issue, it is not key in this thesis and can be 
pursued in future work.  The main goal of this paper is to analyze the conversion 
experiences as reported by Colorado Muslims in light of other studies.  Moreover, I 
believe this case study may provide insight into the motives and backgrounds of the large 








Chapter 1: The Study of Modern Western Converts to Islam 
 
This first chapter examines the history of academic analysis of conversion to 
Islam in the modern West.  This literature has laid the foundation for future study on the 
topic.  Over the years, the analysis of conversion to Islam has become increasingly 
complex as researchers have used different theories, studied different Western Muslims, 
and drawn a wide variety of conclusions—often without stepping back and analyzing 
why these conclusions have varied.  The aim of this chapter is to do just that: to present 
the trends that have characterized the methodology and the findings of studies of Western 
converts, and to explain the seemingly contradictory conclusions.  In the conclusi  of 
this thesis, I will later use some of these models to analyze my findings.       
One of the earliest scholarly discussions of the topic was in Thomas Walker 
Arnold’s seminal book, The Preaching of Islam, first published in 1896.  The appendix, 
“Converts to Islam That Have Not Come Under Direct Missionary Influence,” m ntions a 
handful of modern Western Europeans and Americans who converted.  Arnold even cites 
evidence for perhaps the first American convert: a Methodist missionary known only as 
Norman who converted in Constantinople and returned to the US to preach Islam around 
1875.9  And while Arnold briefly discusses other converts, even the now famous 
                                                          
9 Thomas Walker Arnold, The Preaching of Islam (Lahore: Shirkat-I-Qualam, 1956), 458; based on the 
source Garcin de Tassy, La Langue et Literature Hindoustanies en 1875 (Paris: Librairie orientale de 
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Alexander Webb, he makes no attempt to offer an interpretation of the trends of the 
people who convert.  Sociological analysis of conversion to Islam in the modern Western 
context owes a debt to the research and theories on general religious conversion 
developed throughout the twentieth century.  The first sociological study of converts, 
however, which was conducted by Khan, did not use these theories.  Khan simply found 
general patterns among 25 (14 male and 11 female) converts.  Poston, who is the first to 
apply a variety of these theories to Islam in the modern West, traces his influences, like 
most conversion theorists, to William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience.10  The 
popularity of James’ work awakened interest in the psychological analysis of religious 
practitioners and their experiences, including conversion.  Poston notes, though, that 
James himself owed much of his theory of conversion to Starbuck and Leuba who studied 
Christian converts.  Leuba, who earlier in his life had a conversion experience, though
later believed conversion to be a mere psychological projection, wrote his dissertat on on 
the subject in 1896.  Starbuck, a pupil of James, made the “first successful use of the 
questionnaire method of research” when he sent out surveys to several Christian 
communities.  Eric J. Sharpe remarked that Starbuck’s actions were “bold, naïve and 
immature…nevertheless it worked.”11  James used the responses to those questionnaires 
for Varieties and agreed with Starbuck that religious conversion was most common with 
teens who had to integrate: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Maisonneuve, 1875), 92.  In 1935, an article implied some converts to the Ahmadiya movement were 
white, but only analyzed the African Americans: G. H. Bousquet, “Moslem Religious Influences in the 
United States,” The Moslem World 25, no. 1 (1935): 40-44. 
10 Poston, 146. 
11 Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion (New York: Scribner's, 1975), 106. 
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…the various influences impinging upon the self from the different 
spheres of one’s environment.  International, interracial, and interethnic 
concerns along with political, social, and economic alternatives must be 
combined with specific cultural factors and individual 
idiosyncrasies…Since failure to accomplish this task of integration in 
some way (not necessarily by means of adopting religious faith) can result 
in psychological malformation and mental illness, conversion has, 
according to James, an essentially positive function.12 
 
These ideas set the framework for the study of converts to Islam, a framework that is still 
in use today.13  Subsequently, developments in conversion theories proliferated, though 
the vast majority of the studies were psychology-based and looked only at white 
Christians.  Salzman and Spellman, Baskett, Byrne saw conversion as a “pseudo-
solution,” in which people simply transferred anger and irrationality to a new beliefand 
no real reduction of anxiety took place.  In 1965, Roberts, conversely, found “that those 
who had stayed with parents’ faith were more neurotic.”14     
Also in 1965, Lofland and Stark, in their seminal work, used sociological theory 
to look at “a small millenarian cult,”15 harbingering the ensuing academic fascination 
with conversion to new religious movements.  Lofland and Stark’s work was produced as 
sociology of religion studies were becoming increasingly concerned with showing 
                                                          
12 Poston, 146. 
13 For example, Köse found that 48.6% of his subjects perceived instability in their social worlds in the 2 
years prior to conversion, in Ali Köse, Conversion to Islam: a study of native British converts (London; 
New York: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 81; and problems with integration was a key point in Monika 
Wohlrab-Sahr, “Conversion to Islam: Between Syncretism and Symbolic Battle,” Social Compass 46, no. 3 
(1999): 352.  
14 Leon Salzman, “The Psychology of Religious and Ideological Conversion,” Psychiatry 16 (1953): 177-
87; Charles Spellman, Baskett, Glen and Byrne, Donn, “Manifest Anxiety as a Contributing Factor in 
Religious Conversion,”  Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (1971): 245-47; F. J. Roberts, 
“Some Psychological Factors in Religious Conversion,” British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 
(1965): 185-87; Poston, 148. 
15 John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant 
Perspective,” American Sociological Review (1965): 862. 
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different levels of depth between individuals’ religiosity.16  This theoretical basis 
contrasted with the previous era of sociology of religion which saw religious partici tion 
as having “unitary” dimensions (i.e, simplistic).17  This new perspective permitted 
examining complex and sundry social influences for conversion because it allowed for 
multiple factors—Lofland and Stark found there to be seven factors for conversion.18  
Besides introducing an enduring model, they offered the idea that conversion was used to 
“stave off a hostile religious environment” and to “postpone the genuine integrativ  
crisis,” a theory later countenanced by Gillespie and Erikson.19  Erikson termed this 
postponement the “moratorium process” and specified it as a result of modernization 
which has created a very complex society in which children have to learn more to 
become successfully integrated.  Erikson said this process usually ended in the person’s 
late 20’s at which time most people acquire enough knowledge to become fully 
integrated.  Conversion, Erikson posited, happened during this “moratorium,”20 a theory 
later utilized by Köse.   Conway and Siegelman21 offered a unique theory which 
identified the cause of conversion to be physiological factors; Deutsch22 and Ullman23 
                                                          
16 Roland Robertson, The Sociological Interpretation of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), 51. 
17 Lofland and Stark note: “Unfortunately, it has become conventional in sociology to treat demographic 
characteristics, structural or personal frustrations a d the like, as completely responsible for ‘pushing’ 
persons into collectivities dedicated to protest against the prevailing social order.  These factors are not 
unimportant, but a model composed entirely of them is woefully incomplete.”: 864. 
18 Lofland and Stark, 863. 
19 Poston, 149; V. Bailey Gillespie, Religious Conversion and Personal Identity: How and Why People 
Change (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1979); Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968). 
20 Köse, Conversion, 60.   
21 Flo Conway and Siegelman, Jim, Snapping: America’s Epidemic of Sudden Personality Change (New 
York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1978). 
22 A. Deutsch, “Observations on a Sidewalk Ashram,” Archives of General Psychiatry 32 (1975): 166-75. 
23 C. Ullman, The Transformed Self: The Psychology of Religious Conversion (London: Plenum, 1989). 
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both postulated that unhappy family environments encouraged conversion; and Heirich24 
criticized previous researchers for not being able to show significant psychological 
differences between converts and the general public.   
Poston found 5 general themes in this literature: failure of integration, teens wre 
most likely to convert, there was much stress/anxiety pre-conversion, most had 
relationships with the people who practiced the religion, and converts followed conscious 
motivations to convert.25  Poston used these themes to analyze his research, and they can 
be found in many other works.  However, for conversion to Islam in the West, the most 
widely used conversion theory has been that of Lofland and Skonovd.26  They introduced 
6 conversion motifs to explain the most common reasons people converted.  Lofland and 
Skonovd claimed that converts usually undergo one prominent motif, though sometimes 
they may undergo more than one simultaneously.  Their method allows for the converts 
and researchers to each ascribe reasons for conversion, and synthesize these reason  into 
one model.27  Lastly, the use of converts’ testimonials has emerged as a valid academi 
method because of developments within anthropology based on the influences of 
postmodernism, feminism and minority movements.  Nevertheless, there has been 
                                                          
24 Max Heirich, “Change of Heart: A Test of Some Widely Held Theories About Religious Conversion,” 
American Journal of Sociology (1977): 653. 
25 Poston, 154. 
26 For example, it is used in Köse, Conversion; Anne Sofie Roald, New Muslims in the European Context: 
The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004); Mounia 
Lakhdar et al., “Conversion to Islam Among French Adolescents and Adults: A Systematic Inventory of 
Motives,” The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 17, no. 1 (2007): 2; and G÷ Speelman, 
“Continuity and Discontinuity in Conversion Stories,” Exchange 35, no. 3 (2006): 306. 
27 John Lofland and Norman Skonovd, “Conversion Motifs,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
20, no. 4 (1981): 374. 
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continued debate over what method is best, and if descriptions of people should ever be 
put into the framework of models and statistics or not.28 
 Study of contemporary Western converts to Islam, however, did not begin by 
applying these theories.  Besides Arnold’s observations, one of the earliest academi  
studies of US converts to Islam was a 1938 article attributing African American 
conversion to a “Voodoo Cult” (the Nation of Islam) to the need to mobilize in order to 
resist systemic racial oppression.  The researcher observed that the African mericans 
who most readily accepted the Nation of Islam were recent immigrants from the rural 
southern US to US cities, who experienced difficulties adjusting to the cities’ social ills.29  
But besides a few sensationalized newspaper stories about the Nation of Islam, the s all 
number of converts to Islam meant that relatively little attention was paid to them in 
academic circles.  In 1961, C. Eric Lincoln published his seminal work, The Black 
Muslims in America, in which he also attributed African American conversion to 
primarily social factors.30  Though it is undeniable that conversion to Islam by African 
Americans was greatly influenced by social motivations, these are not the nly motives.  
Nevertheless, in doing so, Lincoln reified “Black Muslims” as a distinct group as 
opposed to immigrant and second generation Muslims.  At the time, white and Latino 
converts, because of their small numbers, were virtually excluded from the discussion. 
 Besides the aforementioned Methodist preacher named Norman, whites have been 
converting to Islam in the US at least as early as 1888 when Alexander Webb became a 
                                                          
28 Marvin Harris, Theories of Culture in Postmodern Times (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 1999), 13. 
29 Erdmann Doane Beynon, “The Voodoo Cult Among Negro Migrants in Detroit,” The American Journal 
of Sociology 43, no. 6 (1938): 899. 




Muslim after reading about the religion.31  In the 1940’s, testimonials of converts began 
appearing in various newspapers and magazines.32  The Sufi movement of the 1970’s 
attracted many converts as well.  During that decade, increasing amounts of literature 
began appearing that explored conversion to Islam in pre-modern times.  Poston found 
that the theories presented by the leading authors, Levtzion and Bulliet, were too 
generalized to apply to modern converts.33  When Poston began his research on converts, 
he found that most converts were reluctant to participate, so he resorted to analyzing 
testimonials of 72 US and European converts.  Poston found that 71 out of 72 converted 
only after a protracted “process” of studying about Islam, rather than havi g  
“spontaneous,” emotion-driven conversion.34  Köse, whose monograph Conversion to 
Islam was the first study that applied the aforementioned theories to living Western 
converts, agreed with Poston’s conclusion.35  Köse’s work was incredibly thorough and 
aimed to see if these many theories could be applied to Muslims.  Among his findings 
were: Ullman’s theory of familial problems in childhood led to conversion did not apply; 
60% of his subjects had at least a B.A., showing the high education level of his converts; 
and 75%  had no religious commitment prior to conversion, though they did already 
believe in a god.  By applying a large number of theories on a study of actual living 
people, a first in a study of Western Muslim converts, his work has become the main 
referent for most subsequent research on converts.  Three years after the publishing of 
Conversion, the journal Social Compass ran a special issue about Muslim conversion in 
                                                          
31 Emory H. Tunison, “Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb: First American Muslim,” The Arab World 1, 
no. 3 (1945): 16. 
32 Poston, 210. 
33 Ibid., 160. 
34 Ibid., 169. 
35 Köse, Conversion, 89. 
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Western Europe.36  Since that time, there have been several journal articles and a handful 
of studies published as books on the subject, many dealing with women and prison 
converts while using European subjects.37  The monographs are often difficult to obtain, 
aside from the books by Roald and Zebiri.  On the other hand, biographies and 
testimonials (often published online) have become increasingly available. 
 The newer findings have deviated from Köse’s.  The work by Poston and Köse 
found the average age of conversion to be in the late 20s and early 30s,38 asserting that 
most converts choose Islam after extensive study (though not necessarily practice) of 
other religions, while recent studies by al-Qwidi and Zebiri show that their subjects 
converted in their mid to lower 20s39 with less “spiritual seeking.”  Both issues are 
related.  Most studies have found that when people convert to Islam in the West, they 
begin to act out the new gender roles that they interpret as encouraged by orthodox 
Islam.40  Men and women often refrain from extramarital sex, the women usually wear a 
hijab and leg and arm coverings, and in some cases both avoid even shaking hands with 
the opposite sex.  Zebiri showed that female converts often took on very traditional roles 
                                                          
36 Stefano Allievi and Felice Dassetto, “Introduction,” Social Compass 46, no. 3 (1999): 243. 
37 Anna Mansson, Becoming Muslim: Western Women’s Conversions to Islam, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006); Van Nieuwkerk (2006); Carolyn Moxey Rouse, Engaged Surrender: African American 
Women and Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Carol Anway, “American Women 
Choosing Islam,” Muslims on the Americanization Path? eds. John L. Esposito and Haddad, Yvonne 
Yazbeck, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 179-98; Carol L. Anway, Daughters of Another Path: 
Experiences of American Women Choosing Islam (Lee’s Summit, MO: Yawna Publications, 1996);  Basia 
Spaler and Slah El-Hassan, “Muslim Converts in Prison,” The Howard Journal 46, no. 2 (2007); Nawal H. 
Ammar, Robert R. Weaver, and Sam Saxon, “Muslims in Pr son: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons,” 
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 48, no. 4 (2004). 
38 Poston: 31.4 in Poston, 166;  Köse: 29.7 in Köse, Conversion, 37. 
39 Al-Qwidi: 25, cited in Zebiri, 43; Zebiri: 23.5 in Zebiri, 43. In a study by Roald, though she did not give 
an average age, she found that “(80%) were under 30” in Roald, 109.  
40 For example, see Madeleine Sultan, “Choosing Islam: a Study of Swedish Converts,” Social Compass 
46, no. 3 (1999): 330; Van Nieuwkerk, 4.  
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in their marriages to Muslims, particularly by leaving the workforce.41  Reluctance to 
speak to a researcher of the opposite sex was also noted by Zebiri42 and should be seen as 
a vital factor in the research results of all studies.  Köse, who is a man, had a subject pool 
with more men than women while Roald and Zebiri, who are both women, had more 
female subjects than male.43  Roald and Zebiri, thus—because of Muslim rules 
prohibiting Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men, while allowing Muslim 
men to marry Christian and Jewish women—found higher percentages of converts who 
had been married to (nominal) Muslims at the time of conversion than Köse, although 
Köse did remark that marriage plays a significant role in some of the conversions.44  Kö e 
also points out that his female subjects had “unstable” identities growing up.45  It is 
likely, then, that given this insecurity and societal pressure to marry, women would chose 
to convert faster than men, thereby showing a younger average age of conversion.  
Poston’s work, which looked at male converts primarily, supports this hypothesis with a 
high conversion age.  It is possible that the reason for the lack of many female 
testimonials in his analysis reflects the fact that he looked at converts who had cnverted 
in the mid-20th century, when females were more restricted in their choices of choosing a 
husband.46  One additional result from this female/male divergence was that only 1/3 of 
Zebiri’s subjects said that intellectual research of Islam was a key to conversion while 
                                                          
41 Zebiri, 14. 
42 Zebiri, 12. 
43 Köse, Conversion, 2: 50 men, 20 women; Zebiri, 9: 20 women, 10 men; Roald, 97: 58% women.  
44 Roald, 97; Zebiri, 57; Köse, Conversion, 114. 
45 Köse, Conversion, 118. 
46 Poston, 163. 
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Köse found intellectual motivations in almost ¾ of his.47  It appears that, at least in 
Britain, women and men convert to Islam for different reasons. 
 In conclusion, I highlight the dearth of studies of conversion to Islam in the US as 
a multiracial and multigender phenomenon.  There have been, of course, a handful of 
articles which identify this subject, but no single monograph (available to me, at least) 
like those of Köse, Roald and Zebiri, devoted to analyzing the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the whole range of US converts.  The long time treatment of 
African American Muslims as a separate subject has not helped either.48  There are 3 
major obstacles to overcoming this separation.  First is the positing of African American 
motivations for conversion as primarily social.49   Second is the self-segregation of 
ethnically-based convert communities which is also reinforced by racial prejudic s in the 
immigrant Muslim community.50  Third is the fact that African American Muslims often 
share a common social context, urban and predominantly African American 
neighborhood, and this uniformity contrasts with the diversity of social milieus for other 
converts who also do not have the experience of racism like that of African Americans.51  
However, these trends are slowly changing.  Newer literature on female conv rts to Islam 
in the US, by showing similar motives for white and African American converts, 
demonstrates that we can in fact look at shared psychological and social motivations for 
                                                          
47 Zebiri, 56; Köse, Conversion, 98.   
48 Richard Brent Turner, Islam in the African-American Experience (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), 6.  Also, studies of African American Muslims are rarely even listed under 
the BP 170.5 (conversion to Islam) Library of Congress call number. 
49 Turner, 6; Edward E. Curtis IV, “African-American Islamization Reconsidered: Black History Narratives 
and Muslim Identity,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 73, no. 3 (2005): 660. 
50 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “The Dynamics of Islamic Identity in North America,” Muslims on the 
Americanization Path? Eds. John L. Esposito and Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1998), 46. 
51 Nuri Tinaz, Conversion of African Americans to Islam (England: University of Warwick, 2001), 99. 
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both groups.  In addition, Richard Turner observed that more and more, African 
American Muslims are integrating with birthright Muslims and converts.52  In fact, a 
recently published book about the Five Percenters, a group which once had a reputation 
for being extremely anti-white, is written by a white convert.53  Concurrently, African 
American understandings of Islam have permeated popular culture and have actually
introduced some whites and Latinos to Islamic culture particularly via hip hop, which is 
often laced with Islamic references,54 and movies, especially the very popular Malcolm 
X.55 Pointing out this interaction and potential for similar motivations is not to say that a
researcher could simply transfer the theories developed for European converts onto US 
subjects, for the US, as stated above, has a significantly different ethnic makeup for its 
convert community—African Americans, for example, make up 1/3 of all US Muslims 
and a large majority of US converts while Blacks make a much smaller percentage in 
England and even less so throughout the rest of Europe.56  
 A study that comprehensively examines all US converts is needed, and the 
conversion model offered by Lewis Rambo can help give structure to this kind of study. 
                                                          
52 Turner, 232. 
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Rambo, in Understanding Religious Conversion, offers a 7 stage model that accounts for 
the various processes that take place throughout a convert’s experience.  These stag —
context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences—are both 
interactive and accumulative, and account for the fact that sometimes individuals go back 
and forth between stages.57  With this model, Rambo has provided a helpful way of 
examining the complex processes in conversion with stages that are defined broadly 
enough to account for several different types of converts and their idiosyncratic motives.   
 In this thesis, I will use these stages as a framework for evaluating my results in 
light of other studies on Western converts to Islam.  I begin with Rambo’s first tage, 
context, which “encompasses a vast panorama of conflicting, confluent, and dialectical 
factors that both facilitate and repress the process of conversion.”  Rambo distinguishes 
between the “macrocontext” and the “microcontext”: the macrocontext is the major
systems of the environment in which the conversion takes place (political, religious, 
economic, etc.) and the microcontext is the “person’s family, friends, ethnic group, 
religious community, and neighborhood.”58  Over the next 2 chapters, I will discuss the 
macrocontext, first with a brief overview of conversion in Islam, focusing especially on 
conversion in the US.  In chapter 3 I will examine the history of Islam in Colorado and 
Colorado’s overall social, economic, and political environment.  Finally, in chapter 4, I 
will use the rest of Rambo’s stages, beginning with the microcontext of the 13 converts i  
this study, and analyze them to understand how and why conversion has increased in the 
US since 9/11. 
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Chapter 2: Macrocontext: Conversion to Islam in the US 
  
 Conversion to Islam in the US has been the result of myriad movements and 
individual efforts.  From the proselytization efforts of Alexander Webb to the post-9/11 
wave of conversion, Islam in the US has attracted a wide range of people who come from 
very different backgrounds and are introduced to Islam via very different paths.  This 
chapter examines those paths to show how Islam has come to America and has led to the 
expansion of what it means to be a Muslim in the US.  I focus on 2 main issues: the 
arrivals of Muslims to the US and how Islam has been spread to non-Muslims (which I 
break down into 3 groups: African Americans, Latinos, and whites).59  However, before 
looking specifically at the US, it is necessary to briefly describe the history of conversion 
in Islam in general because several factors in this history have contributed to conversion 
in the US.  These issues include Qur’anic exhortations to proselytize, the reasons people 
have converted to Islam throughout history (which, as I will show, are used again in the 
reasons US converts give for conversion), and the widespread revival movements in the 
18th, 19th, and 20th centuries which were the cause of several early conversions in the US. 
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Conversion in Islamic History 
 According to the Qur’an, God created all things, and their purpose is to serve and 
worship Him (6:102; 16:48-50; 21:19-20; 64:1).  However, humans are weak, inclined to 
fight (2:30; 4:28), and are seduced to stray from the correct relationship with God 
(20:121; 82:6-7).  So, in His mercy, God seeks to restore humans to their true 
relationship.  In the Qur’an, this is seen as turning (taba) or returning (inaba) to God’s 
guidance (huda).  God can control people, making them return to his guidance (42:8, 13; 
48:25), but He also allows people to choose to demonstrate their worth with good deeds 
(29:9; 45:30), suggesting that conversion (“reversion”—a term that many converts today 
use) to Islam requires some human initiative.60  Another example of using human 
initiative in order to return to God’s guidance is by rationally understanding humankind’s 
place in the world, a process taken by Ibrahim/Abraham (6:74-79).  The act of calling
(da’wah) humans to return to God’s guidance is done both by God through signs (2:221) 
and by Muhammad (7:193; 12:108; 28:87)—and therefore all Muslims, as they are 
supposed to imitate the Prophet.  This “calling” is to be done using “wisdom and goodly 
exhortation, and hav[ing] disputations with [non-Muslims] in the best manner…” 
(16:125).61  These issues are central to the understanding of the meaning of conversion in 
the Qur’an and its exhortation of Muslims to call others to Islam.    
 After receiving the revelation in 610 C.E., Muhammad did not publicize it for 3 
years.  Meanwhile, he “called” to Islam those closest to him: Khadija, Ali, Abu Bakr and 
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a few others. Encouraged by these early conversions, he began preaching in public in 
Mecca. At first, Muhammad was not very successful in bringing many Meccans to Islam.   
In fact, he was criticized and threatened by the Meccans, though he was protected 
because he was a member of the Banu Hashim, a respected Meccan family, and was lso 
looked after by Abu Talib who was an influential man in the community.  Mecca was 
both a trade center and the location of the Ka’ba, which was an Arab pilgrimage site.  
Muhammad preached to pilgrims and travelers, converting only a few. After Abu Talib 
died, Muhammad lost much of his protection from the Meccans and so emigrated with 
150 followers to Medina in 622 C.E.  Muhammad was able to create peace between 2 
families that had been fighting each other in Medina and they then pledged loyalty t 
Muhammad who thus became a religious, military, and political leader. Islam was now 
being spread by many people, and attraction to Islam was augmented by Muhammad’s 
preaching of equality for all, his granting of land to converts, and his sending of letters to 
nearby leaders.  By 628 C.E., there were 10,000 Muslims.62 
 Islam spread rapidly throughout the Middle East within the first 100 years of the
religion.  By the early 8th century, Muslims had gained military and political control in 
the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Persia, and western India.  Because Islam covered 
such a wide territory, it would be impossible to do justice to the history of the 
innumerable instances of conversion in this brief overview.  Nonetheless, it is necessary 
to point out some important themes.  First of all, though the Muslims had military and 
political rule in this area, not all the citizens under Muslim rule converted to Islam.  
Richard Bulliet has suggested that mass conversions of whole populations required 2 
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factors: threats to Islam’s dominance had to be inconceivable and a “more or less uniform 
set of social and religious institutions” had to be in place.63  There has been some debate 
over the rate of conversion, which is primarily the result of the fact that Muslims 
generally did not explicitly record conversions.64 Generally, Jews and Christians (and in 
India, Hindus) were treated as dhimmis, which meant that they were taxed higher than 
Muslims, did not serve in the military, and often were prohibited from reaching the 
highest levels of employment.  Sometimes, people in Muslim lands were forced to 
convert, but overall this was rare.65  To avoid the dhimmi status and because non-
Muslims often did not like the socio-political structures under which they lived, many
people converted to Islam.  When Islam spread to places not under Muslim rule, such as 
in East and West Africa, the Malabar coast in India, and in Indonesia—Islam was 
especially attractive to those of the lower classes who saw in Islam universal equality and 
therefore a means to improve their social condition.66  It should be noted that people, both 
those under Muslim rule and those not, also converted to Islam for spiritual reasons.67 
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 Muslim geographical expansion in Europe came to an end at the gates of Vienna 
in 1683.  By this time, Western Europe had overtaken the Muslims as the dominant force 
in the world through its increasing control of the international economy and 
advancements in warfare technology; the Muslim world had stagnated and began to 
imitate its Western neighbors.68  But in the 18th century, a powerful Muslim response 
began to emerge.  Concerned about the internal deterioration of the Muslim world, 
Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab led a puritanical Muslim movement in Saudi Arabia in the 
mid-to-late 18th century with the goal of purifying Islam.  His movement rejected old 
schools of law and allowed for a reinterpretation of Islam that accounted for modern 
technology (which had been criticized by older Muslims and was therefore seen a  
prohibitive of Muslim advancement).  Wahhab also encouraged stricter Islamic pract e, 
forbidding newer religious activities which he thought were not condoned by the Qur’an.  
In 1744, he gained an alliance with the Saudi ruling elites by giving them legitimacy, and 
began to influence the practices at Mecca which influenced those Muslims from all over 
the world who made their Hajj there.69  This movement was followed, in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, by the Pan-Islamic movement (especially though the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5.  After all, Bulliet says, even early Arab Muslims had little knowledge of the Qur’an and theological 
issues, and so a “religious” conversion for them was equated with a change in social status, Bulliet, 
“Conversion Stories”, 129-131.  W.M. Watt, however, notes that while in the Qur’an, conversion is 
“always described in external terms, and no attention is paid to the man’s inner experiences,” when tribes 
claim “some of their members had been Muslims at an early date, they took the slightest external signs as 
evidence of the inner response, thereby apparently implying that the inner response was the essential 
thing,” W. M. Watt, “Conversion to Islam at the Time of the Prophet,” in Early Islam: Collected Articles 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 41. 
68 Cf. Hakan Berument and Asli Gunay, “Inflation Dynamics and its Sources in the Ottoman Empire: 1586-
1913,” International Review of Applied Economics, 21, no. 2 (2007): 207-245; Omer Lutfi Barkan, “The 
Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (1975): 3-28; Omer Taspinar, Kurdish Nationalism and 
Political Islam in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2005), 10-14. 
69 Arnold, 427. 
22 
 
Jamal al-Din Afghani), the revivalist movements of the Ahmadiya and Jamaat-I Isl mi in 
what is now Pakistan, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  Because of these 
movements and the concurrent growth and speed of communication technology and 
travel, Muslims were invigorated and increased proselytizing efforts throughout the 
world which continue today.       
 
Conversion to Islam in US History 
 There is some evidence to suggest that Muslims came to America prior to 
Columbus’ arrival in 1492.  Several Muslim historians and geographers record what are 
possible trips taken by Spanish and West African Muslims between the 9th and 14th 
centuries, and Islamic (Arabic) inscriptions are believed to have been discovered in 
several places throughout the southeastern and southwestern US.70  Also, it is believed 
that several Native American groups converted to Islam because some tribe names and 
areas are said to have Islamic origins.  In addition, some records indicate that Muslims 
accompanied Columbus in his voyages.  Some current Native American converts to Islam 
point to these examples as evidence for their having a true Islamic heritage.71  However, 
as Jane I. Smith, a leading scholar in Islam in America, has written, “Evidence to support 
such claims…is still sufficiently vague that the thesis remains somewhat hypo hetical.”72  
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 Scholars are certain, however, that West African Muslims were brought to 
America as slaves.  African slaves first arrived in the US in 1619,73 but our first “reliable” 
documentation of Muslim names being recorded appeared in 1717.74  In following the 
pattern of the European slave traders, Americans separated tribal kinsmen so they could 
not communicate with each other and therefore not revolt.75  The practices of religions 
from Africa, including Islam, were prohibited for the same reason, and proselytization 
was abated.76  Importation of slaves was outlawed in 180877 and the whole institution was 
legally ended in 1865. 
 It has now become common to present the immigration of post-slave trade 
Muslims in 5 waves.  The first wave arrived from the Middle East, mostly from the 
Levant, between 1875 and 1912.  They were generally unskilled and uneducated, 
escaping the economic problems of the Ottoman Empire.  They worked in factories, 
mines, and as peddlers.  The second and third waves followed World War I, and they 
were Muslims who were the relatives of the people who had come in the first wave and 
had told them of the opportunities in the US.  The fourth wave immigrated after World 
War II until 1960.78  These people were, on the whole, more educated, wealthy, urban, 
and westernized than their predecessors.  The fifth wave began and continues today after 
President Johnson signed an immigration act in 1965 which reduced restrictions on 
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immigration.  Additionally, the US has received increasing numbers of refugees from 
Muslim countries.79   
 Many of the earliest immigrants, driven by a desire to avoid to their home 
countries, Christianized their names, married non-Muslims, and became thoroughly 
“assimilated.”80  However, Muslim identity was far from being entirely discarded in the 
US.  The first documented prayer group appeared in Ross, North Dakota in 1900;81 the 
first mosque was built in Highland Park Detroit in 1919;82 a Young men’s Muslim 
Association (modeled after the YMCA) was established in Brooklyn in 1923; and in 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the Muslim-populated Rose Fraternity Lodge was established in 
1925 followed by the first long lasting mosque in the US which was built in 1934.83  By 
the 1960s, several Islamic associations were set up both by the US Muslims and by 
Muslim country governments, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  These associations 
and mosques, while sometimes proposing to proselytize, were for the most part 
isolationist.84   
 Despite the reluctance of many early US Islamic groups to organize 
proselytization efforts, conversions still occured.  Often, Muslim men married non-
Muslim women who converted to Islam.  Sometimes, individuals who had met non-
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proselytizing Muslims in the US or abroad became attracted to the religion and 
converted.  Often, these individuals were white, and if the work of Poston and the widely 
read testimony of Jeffery Lang are any indication, they had above average education and 
weak religious upbringing.85 
 In addition, while the major Sunni groups in the US remained isolationist, several 
smaller groups were very active in proselytizing.  I have already presented evid nce for 
the Methodist-turned-Muslim preacher named Norman who began his mission in the 
1870s, and about which little else is known.  Alexander Webb’s story, on the other hand, 
is now famous.  Webb was appointed to be American Consul in the Philippines in 1887, 
and, having already begun a search for a “satisfying faith to replace Christianity” which 
he saw as not being rational, in Manila he began to read many Muslim works that dealt 
impressively with philosophical issues, and decided to convert.86  In Manila, Webb met 
several wealthy Indian Muslim businessmen who, being impressed with Webb’s 
devotion, agreed to sponsor a proselytization effort led by Webb in the US, which he 
began when he returned to New York in 1893.87  Webb established a journal, a lecture 
hall with a library, and a book publishing house.  “Very little direct contact with non-
Muslims was ever established, and all three of Webb’s operations were halted within a 
few months of their inception.”88  And though Webb made 2 more attempts at publishing 
Muslim journals, both these also dissolved quickly.89  Two followers of Webb created a 
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rival splinter group which, along with Webb’s own group, disintegrated by the end of the 
century.90 
 After Webb, other missionizing groups sprung up.  The Ahmadiya movement 
came to the US in 1920; by 1933 it was established in 6 major cities, and by 1959 it had 
an estimated 500 converts.  Attractive because it was a non-discriminatory religion, 
“Orientals” composed around 150 of its members, up to 40 were “of ‘Muslim’ 
extraction,” 50 were white, and the remaining half were African American.91  I  the 
1940s and 1950s, the Jamaat-i-Tabligh sent missionaries, though they were less 
successful than their Pakistani competitors.92  Sufis were also early arrivals in the US, 
with the first organized group coming from the Chisti order which had a few US 
followers in the 1920s.93  Sufi membership was minimal until immigration restrictions 
became more lax in the 1960s, at which point Sufis attracted many from the counter 
culture movement.94  Marcia Hermansen estimates that in the 1980s and 1990s, roughly 
25,000 people participated in Sufi movements, and today at most 10,000 are currently 
active, of which 4,000 are white, 2,000 are African American, and the rest are 
immigrants.95 
 African Americans have developed their own distinct Muslim communities of 
which many are rejected as even being “Muslim” by mainstream Sunnis.  In 1928, Noble 
Drew Ali established the official headquarters of the Moorish Science Temple in 
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Chicago.  Traditions conflict over Drew Ali’s exact upbringing, but it is commonly 
accepted that he studied religion in Egypt and in 1927 wrote The Holy Koran of the 
Moorish Science Temple of America.96  This book teaches a way to spiritual 
enlightenment, drawing on Black Nationalism, Christian, Gnostic, Masonic and Isl mic 
ideologies.  Drew Ali taught his lessons, as would future African American Muslim 
leaders, in the African American ghettos of major US cities.  There are som  reports that 
assert that the founder of the Nation of Islam (NOI), Wallace D. Fard, followed Drew Ali 
who mysteriously died in 1929.  It is reported that by 1933, Fard, who met people 
because of his trade as a door-to-door peddler, had 8,000 followers of his NOI.  Though 
the message he preached was similar to Drew Ali’s, it varied in certain disti ct ways.  
While Drew Ali promoted a tolerating view of all people and beliefs, Fard chastised 
Christianity as the tool of the white man—who he called the “devils.”  He also tugh  that 
the “Blackman” was the original man and was, by nature, a god (which was similar to 
Drew Ali’s teachings).  Fard created secret rituals, doctrines and lessons a  well, to be 
inculcated on initiates.97  Prior to his death in 1934, Fard appointed Elijah Muhammad as 
his successor.  Muhammad soon elaborated on Fard’s teachings, writing several books.  
In the late 1950’s, as many religious groups do, the NOI began to splinter off into 
disparate movements.  Some left because they felt the NOI’s strict morality, dress and 
financial obligations were too demanding, some were disappointed with Muhammad’s 
own apparent moral laxity, while some felt that the NOI had deviated too far from the 
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“true” Muslim path.98  When Muhammad passed away in 1975, his son, W. D. 
Muhammad, was made leader of the NOI and made changes to the group to bring it more 
in line with Sunni Islam, and eventually changing the name of the group several times.99  
In 1981, Louis Farrakhan led a group that splintered from W. D. Muhammad and 
reclaimed the NOI name and its racial priorities.  Today, most African American 
Muslims follow Sunni Islam. 
 Recently there has been increasing attention paid to the Latino Muslim 
phenomenon as their communities have formed throughout the US, Central and South 
America.100  In the US, Latino Muslim communities have emerged in New York, New 
Jersey, Chicago and Miami,101 often through the interaction with African American 
Muslims.  In 1992, Latino converts began meeting informally in Los Angeles until 1999, 
when they formed the Latino-Muslim Movement and began meeting formally at the ILM 
Foundation where the imam, an African American named Saadiq Saafir, hoped to “tear 
down the barriers that divide blacks and Latinos.”102  Ibrahim Gonzalez, who co-founded 
Alianza Islamica in 1975, was introduced to Islam by African American Muslims in East 
Harlem in the 1960’s.103  In addition, there are several other groups and websites, with 
estimates for the Latino Muslim population reaching up to 60,000.104  It is often reported 
that US Latino Muslims, like their co-religionists throughout Latin America, are drawn to 
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Islam because of dissatisfaction with Christianity and the appeal of historical ties of Islam 
with Spanish culture dating back to 711 when Muslims first entered Spain.  Fidel Castro 
expressed these views of a shared heritage: 
  We all have lighter or darker skin.  Lighter skin implies descent from  
  Spaniards who themselves were colonized by Moors that came from  
  Africa.  Those who are more or less dark-skinned came directly from  
  Africa.  Moreover, nobody can consider himself as being of pure, much  
  less superior, race.105  
 
Gonzalez has reiterated that feeling, and often tells journalists that Latinos have been 
disenfranchised and Islam helps end this feeling of separateness by being “a universal 
faith where people of all walks of life pray together.  Religion unifies culture and 
enhances it.”106  Others feel Islam could unite discreet (nationally or ethnically-based) 
Latino communities.107  One white Latino Muslim has also pointed out that the Islamic 
identity has given him respect in his own Bronx neighborhood, respect that he would not 
have gotten because of his skin color.108  Latino Muslims generally feel “torn” from their 
Muslim roots by colonization and they also feel that Christian American society do s not 
meet their spiritual or social needs.   
 Today, the Muslim population is estimated to be between 1 to 11 million and it 
has been identified as the fastest growing religion in the US.109  A 2007 survey by the 
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Pew Research Center reports that 2/3 of US Muslims were born outside the US, and 
African Americans make up half of those born here, and converts total 21% of all US 
Muslims.110  African Americans have been estimated to compose anywhere from 20% to 
80% of US converts,111 and estimates for white Muslims have ranged from 40,000 to 
80,000.112  The report, based off 179 convert interviews, noted that about half of the 
converts took the shahada (pronouncement of faith) when they were under 21, 34% when 
between 21 and 35, and 17% for over 35; 2/3 came from Protestant religions, 10% from 
Catholicism, 5% from other religions, and 10% had no prior religion; for 58%, the appeal 
of Islam was in aspects of the religion, while 18% felt the need to convert because other 
family members were Muslims.113  The Pew report admits to limitations in its survey 
method: it was done solely by telephone, most of the converts it interviewed were 
African American, it asked converts very few questions about their conversion 
experiences, and actual percentages and numbers remain unknown.114  After 9/11, while 
many Middle Eastern students returned home to avoid harassment and mosque 
construction virtually ceased,115 conversion has increased dramatically.  Meanwhile, little 
else is known about these converts and less is known about the state-to-state variations.     
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Chapter 3: Macrocontext: Muslims of Colorado 
 
 This chapter examines the history of Muslims in Colorado, their population 
growth, the accretions of distinct sectarian groups, and the response of the non-Muslim 
surrounding community.  All of these factors have played a role in how Muslims, and 
Islam in general, have reached Colorado’s non-Muslims.  Colorado’s populace is 71%
non-Hispanic white, 20% Latino, and 4% black—other ethnic groups are very small.  The 
population is primarily suburban, living in the Denver-Metro area.  Eighty-seven percent 
of Colorado adults have at least a high school diploma and 37% have at least a B.A.116  It 
is a swing state in national elections and is roughly evenly divided between democrat and 
republican.  The largest religious group in Colorado is Catholic, followed by Evangelical 
Protestant.117  Muslims make up less than 1% of the population, yet Islam has attracted 
several converts over the years.   
 
Population 
 Today, the population estimates of Colorado’s Muslim community are not exact, 
similar to estimates for the Muslim population of the US as a whole.  Due to Public Law 
94-521 (1976), the Census Bureau is prohibited from asking for religious affiliation.  In 
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addition, there were no official attempts to measure the population before 2000.  The 
Association of Religion Data Archives estimated Denver’s Muslim population in 2000 to 
be 14,855.118  This seems particularly small when compared with estimates given by 
Muslim leaders throughout the years.   The Association of Religion Data Archives’ 
method of contacting religious centers for information—which does not account for the 
many small mosques that are reticent to talk to outsiders, the many individuals who are 
scared to admit their affiliation out of fear of government or civilian harassment, and the 
fact that the majority of US Muslims are not members of mosques—makes their number 
seem questionable, though it does account for a possible overlap of membership with 
multiple mosques.  The Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional 
Research at the University of Albany also estimates close to 14,000, but uses an 
alternative method.119  Their research involves taking official numbers from the 2000 US 
census and counting all people as Muslim who identify themselves as natives or 
descendants of natives from all-Muslim countries.  This method fails to account for the
fact that some members of those countries were not in fact Muslims (perhaps the reason 
for their emigration), nor does it account for the growing numbers of African American, 
white, and Latino Muslims.  Lastly, Adherents.com, which compiles its own list of 
religious populations, references a Denver newspaper article that estimat there to be 
10,000 Muslims currently living in Colorado.120  However, newspaper articles often 
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receive their information solely from members of the Muslim community who could have 
a vested interest in exaggerating their numbers.   
 Despite these problems, one cannot deny that there was a surge in the Muslim 
population growth during the 1980’s and early 1990’s.  The sheer number of Islamic 
institutions established in Colorado during and since that time reflects this surge.  Some 
ascribe this swelling to the US oil boom in the mid-eighties as well as an increasing 
number of South Asian, Middle Eastern and North African people who have been 
emigrating in search of a better standard of living or coming as refugees.121  In my 
interviews with Muslims throughout the state, I have heard a wide variety of estimates of 
today’s Muslim population from as few as 15,000 to as high as 50,000.  In this paper I 
will present estimates that seem to generally follow the trend of growing Muslim 
organizations.  That the estimate of 15,000 was consistently used throughout the 1990’s, 
and the likelihood that the formal estimates might be somewhat low, suggests that the 
current Colorado Muslim population is around 25,000, with 20,000 in Denver.  
Colorado’s 2007 population was 4.8 million—making the Muslim population less than 
1%.  However, it is important to note that while Colorado’s population has trebled since 
the 1950’s, its Muslim population has increased at least tenfold, and appears to be 
growing.122      
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 Early Muslim arrival to Colorado was composed of trickling immigration.  
According to a one-time Denver imam, at around 1900, a few Muslim prairie peddlers 
came to Colorado with the first wave of Middle Eastern immigration to the US.123  They 
were mostly Syrian and Lebanese men and usually intermarried with local Christians.  In 
1914, Kamiss Mahmoud Shelby arrived from Palestine.  He would become Denver’s only 
imam for the next thirty years.  During that time, Shelby oversaw only 2 Muslim wedding 
ceremonies—1 of which was for a family from Utah who came to Denver because Shelby
was the closest imam.124  Throughout the years, Shelby gave sermons (khutba) in Denver 
and Wyoming.  In 1933, he was quoted as saying Denver was home to “less than ten” 
Muslim residents.125  The Muslim community remained very small through the 1950’s.  
A local newspaper noted that 28 Muslims gathered for prayer in a Denver park for the 
Bairam (Eid) feast.126 
 In the 1960’s, though the Muslim community was still small, around 200 families, 
a group of about 7 men formed the Colorado Muslim Society (CMS) as a way to keep the 
community together.  Because the community was so small, just to survive, the members 
had to overlook each other’s sectarian (Sunni and Shi’a), cultural (Arab, Afghan, 
Egyptian, Indian, Pakistani, etc.), and political differences. CMS was therefore ap litical 
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and focused on observing, preserving, and practicing the fundamental traditions of the 
Islamic culture.  Whenever possible, 2 or 3 families would meet in each other’s home for 
worship and discussions.  Soon, they moved to a church basement to accommodate the 
slowly growing Muslim population that was immigrating after the US passed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. In 1974, CMS purchased its own building, a 
small house, which accommodated close to 200 people.  
 In the 1970’s, international students from Muslim countries including the wealthy 
Arab nations: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, represented a major 
component of the Muslim community.127 Moreover, their membership in CMS became 
close to a majority. Relying on their number and generous donations, they pressured to 
control the Society's management.  However, because the students were predominantly 
non-citizens and transient, the resident Muslim community objected and resisted their 
interference in the affairs of the Society. The problem became acute duringthe process of 
revising the Society’s constitution.  The newly revised Constitution resolved the problem 
by combining the students together with non-resident community members who have 
non-voting Associate Membership status.   Additionally, during the early 1980’s, and for 
convenience, the students purchased a house near the University of Denver, and used it 
for their worship.  As it became crowded, because of the overflowing resident community 
began to join them there, the students bought a larger building and sold the house. Due to 
the recession in the 1980’s, the unsettling conditions in the Middle East, and the Iraq/Iran 
war, hundreds of the students departed to their home countries. Their governments felt 
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the students were potentially at risk and asked them to return.  The building these 
students left behind eventually became the currently community-run Islamic center 
named The Denver Islamic Society. 
 In the 1970’s other mosques began to appear.  In 1972, Muhammad Mosque 51 
was granted the status of being the first official Nation of Islam mosque in Colorado.  
Within a few more years, Masjid Al-Haqq, a Sunni African American mosque was 
started.  By 1980, there were an estimated 3,000 Muslims in Denver, and Colorado 
college towns had several groups forming.  That year, the Greeley Islamic Center was 
established and the University of Colorado at Boulder students started their chapter of the 
Muslim Student Association (MSA).  Reshad Field, of the Sufi Mevlevi order, began 
teaching classes in Boulder in 1976, and other tekkes began springing up in the 1980’s 
for the Chisti, Naqshbandi, and Jerrahi orders.  Also, in Fort Collins, a city 45 miles north 
of Denver and home of Colorado State University (CSU), a Muslim community emerged 
in 1980.  They acquired a former church to establish their first Islamic center, following 
the formation of the CSU MSA in 1978.  The following year, both the Sunni Denver 
Islamic Society and the Wahhabi-Sunni Islamic Center of Boulder opened their oors to 
serve the mushrooming population.  In 1983, the CMS built Denver’s first distinctly 
“Muslim” mosque with the features of a dome and minaret.  The 10,000 square-foot 
mosque was built in a southeast Denver suburb.  By then, the Muslim population had 
doubled its 1980 numbers.  This was helped because in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
there was a rise in male Muslim immigrants marrying white American wives who later 
converted.  Additionally, sometimes, individuals who had Muslim friends also came into 
the faith.       
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 In 1992, the local press said there were 15,000 Muslims in Colorado.128  The 
following year, community members organized the first Muslim school, the Crescent 
View Academy, in the rooms of their Islamic center.  However, because of strong 
enrollment and limited spaced at the CMS, in 1994 they purchased a nearby building.  
The school is still in use and provides instruction from kindergarten through 8th rade.  
Like similar schools throughout the country, it instructs students on subjects such as 
history, math and science, but also teaches Arabic and Qur’anic studies—while offerng 
the children an environment that does not require students to adjust their schedules for 
non-Muslim related holidays (such as days off for Thanksgiving).   
 The rest of the 1990’s were marked with more expansion.  In 1995, the first Shi’a 
community center was established in a west Denver neighborhood.  The next year saw 
the installation of 2 prayer spaces at the Denver International Airport: 1 inside for 
travelers and 1 outside for Muslim taxi drivers.  About 30 Indian and Pakistani Shi’a 
Muslims formed the Imamia Education Society in 1998, which promoted religious and 
cultural programs, including youth activities.  In the following year, while t e CMS was 
seeing 500 regular attendees to its Friday prayer, Masjid Ikhlas opened in a northern 
Denver suburb.  A year later, some members of Masjid Al-Haqq left it and formed 
Masjid Shuhada’a and the North East Denver Islamic Center.  Both communities follow 
the teachings of W. D. Muhammad.  By 2001, the Fort Collins Muslim community, 
which had grown from 200 people in 1980 to 1,200, was beginning to plan for the 
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building of a new mosque.  However, as has been the trend throughout the US,129 no 
mosques have been constructed in Colorado since 9/11.   
 
Difficulties in the Community 
 As the Muslim population in Colorado grew, so did the amount of controversy 
between the local Muslim and non-Muslim communities.  When the CMS built 
Colorado’s only traditional-looking mosque in the early 1980’s, residents of the suburban 
community opposed it at city council meetings.  When CMS prepared to make an 
addition to the mosque in the late 1990’s, residents spoke up again, but to no avail.  Prior 
to 1991, there were no headlines about violence towards Muslims.  However, during the 
Iraq war in 1991, there were several reported incidents of Muslims students being 
harassed.130  That same year, Denver Nuggets point guard Mahmoud Abdul Rauf 
(formerly Chris Jackson) caused a stir by converting to Islam—several newspaper articles 
detailed how his Gulfport, Mississippi hometown was overwhelmingly disappointed in 
his conversion.131  After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, various Muslim groups 
were threatened again—despite the CMS publicly condemning violence.132  In 1996, 
Abdul Rauf made national headlines again by refusing to stand during the national 
anthem before NBA games, citing religious reasons, despite the CMS’ (Abdul Rauf’s
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main place of worship) statement that they did not support the action.133  Nevertheless, 
soon local “shock jock” DJ’s went to the CMS mosque with a trumpet and bugle playing 
the “Star Spangled Banner” during the middle of a prayer.  The DJ’s were fir d. Between 
1998 and 1999, local papers cited “several” reports of hate crimes against Muslims, 
including two murders of Muslim immigrants and threats made by a man who was 
arrested with bomb-making material, 4 guns and 1,000 rounds of ammunition.134      
 After 9/11, there was a marked increase in discrimination against Muslims in 
Colorado—despite CMS’ repeated condemnation of terrorism.135  Hate crimes doubled in 
the 4th quarter of 2001, making the total number that year 18.136  These crimes included 
threatening phone calls to Muslims and groups, threats made in public, and vandalism 
(broken windows, fires set, blood and graffiti splattered on walls of mosques).  Some 
mosques required 24-hour police surveillance for several weeks following the attacks.  
Because of fear of violence and US government pressure (e.g. not explicitly stating what 
an acceptable Islamic organization is), more Middle Eastern Muslims began retur ing to 
their native countries.137  Often, they were members of mosques to which they made large 
financial donations.  Furthermore, because of government scrutiny of Muslim non-
profits, Muslims began to withdraw from mosque participation.  Without these donations, 
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Denver’s Shi’a mosque, Masjid Ahl-al-Beit, began experiencing financial problems138 
and, because of a lawsuit filed by its main imam against the mosque, most members left 
and created other Shi’a groups since 2004. 
 
2002 to Present 
 Colorado was not alone in seeing a spike in hate crimes in the months 
immediately following 9/11—this was the trend throughout the US.  And, like other 
states, Colorado’s reported hate crimes significantly reduced in 2002 to 3 reported 
incidents.139  That year, an MSA at the University of Colorado at Denver was formed, 
along with the group Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (MILA).  Because a large 
percentage of Colorado (and US) Muslims do not attend a mosque (for example, at CMS’ 
2007 Ramadan Eid prayer, 2,000 people attended although there are only about 750 
official members of the mosque) some members of the Muslim community decide  to 
organize a non-profit, focusing on Islamic education and charity—with the hope of 
overcoming theological and cultural differences between the increasingly separate 
Muslim groups in Denver.  Today they have around 300 members and anywhere between 
30 to 50 who participate regularly. 
 Other groups continued to form in the community.  In 2003, the Multicultural 
Mosaic Foundation (MMF) was established.  The MMF is a growing international 
movement composed of primarily Turkish Muslims who follow the teachings of 
Fethullah Gulen.  Also, while Iraqi members of the Masjid Ahl-al-Beit continued 
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attending there, others began to funnel into 2 disparate groups.  With roughly 60 
participants each at important prayers, the Imamia Education Society founded by South 
Asian Shi’as and an Islamic center founded by Persian Shi’as have flourished and are
open to worshippers from any ethnic and national background.  In addition, there has also 
been increased participation in national organizations like the Muslim Youth Foundation 
and Muslim American Society, though neither group has maintained strong support.  
Statewide, the Colorado Muslim Council holds a monthly meeting for Colorado imams to 
establish consistent dates for the start and finish of Muslim holidays.  However, this 
Council does not have consistent participation either and does not represent a true unified 
coalition.  
 In the last decade, the ethnic backgrounds of Colorado Muslims have diversified.  
With the increased media attention to Islam since the late 1990s, many white and some 
Latino residents have converted.  Also, because of recent warfare and economic problems 
in Muslim African states, there has been a significant increase in numbers of Sudanese, 
Morroccans, and especially Somalians.140  At the same time, Middle Eastern students are 
slowly beginning to re-emerge in Colorado universities.  Today, the members of the CMS 
come from a wide range of ethnicities and are not completely dominated by 1 particular 
nationality or ethnic group.  In Denver’s north suburb, Northglenn, a significant Afghani 
community has emerged and has even set up its own mosque.  Nevertheless, neither the 
Afghani community, nor any other Muslim community in Colorado, has created any sort 
of “neighborhood” similar to those that have been observed in larger US cities.  
Generally, though, several mosques are located in southeast Denver and its adjoining 
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suburbs.  Because Colorado Muslims, like their brethren throughout the US, are typically 
well-educated and make good incomes, there is an effort amongst some to live on that 
side of town as it is closest to Denver’s most elite school district, Cherry Creek.141  
 Despite the increasing amount of Muslim groups, discrimination against Colorado 
Muslims has not been completely thwarted.  The CMS was vandalized with hate graffi i 
in 2003142 and received bomb threats after the death of a US soldier in Iraq in 2004.143  
The federal government detained Denver resident Haroon Rashid from 2002 to 2006 and 
failed to produce evidence of his terrorist involvements.144  Other incidents include a 
remark by Colorado Representative Tom Tancredo that the US should bomb Mecca as a 
way of ending all terrorism; 5 reported incidents of Denver talk radio hosts making 
discriminatory remarks about Islam and Muslims in 2007; multiple gunshots fired at the 
Greeley mosque that same year; and in September 2008 national headlines were made 
concerning the dispute between Swift meat plant and its Somalian workers concerning, 
among other things, their ablutions at work during Ramadan.145  For many members of 
the Muslim and Christian community alike, these discriminatory incidents and worl
events over the past 25 years have been the impetus for interfaith dialogue 
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 Before the 1980’s, there were just a handful of instances when a Muslim spoke as 
a representative of his faith to a non-Muslim audience.  These meetings transpired via 
church invitations to a few prominent Denver Muslims.   But for the majority, the only 
opportunity for most Colorado non-Muslims to hear about Islam from Colorado Muslims 
was through the sporadic newspaper interviews with members of the Muslim community 
throughout the first 80 years of the 20th century.  Those articles’ purpose, primarily, was 
to describe Muslim rituals and ideas—they were only newsworthy in the sense that their 
practices were unique in Colorado.  However, as the Colorado Muslim population 
increased and world affairs made it seem more and more rational to work out irenic 
solutions for relations with the Middle East, members of the Colorado religious 
community began working on interfaith dialogue, following in the footsteps of other 
national and international religious groups.  Today, there are dozens of interfaith groups 
which have Muslim representation, though Muslim converts rarely convert to Islam 







Chapter 4: 13 Denver Converts 
  
 This chapter presents the findings of my interviews and compares the results with 
the findings of other studies.  After the discussion in each section, I provide a brief 
summary of the main points of that section.  In the conclusion of this chapter I bring 
together all the findings to show the differences and similarities Colorado converts to 
Islam have as compared to the other studied modern Western converts to Islam.  There 
are 4 salient differences:  the Colorado converts, on the whole, had religious upbringings; 
most have moved several times throughout their lives; European converts tended to have 
higher education levels; and Colorado converts are far less attracted to intellectual aspects 
of Islam, while being more attracted to spiritual aspects.    
 This research is an ethnographic, participant-observation study, backed with 
historical literature research.  The interviews were conducted over the course of 5 weeks 
(December 2008 to January 2009) at a weekly “Beginning Islam” class at the CMS, held 
Saturday evenings after the Maghrib prayer for roughly 2 hours.  I had contacted the 
mosque in October and made arrangements with the instructor of the class to do the 
interviews.  Three people declined to be interviewed.  As per the teacher’s instruct ons, I 
interviewed the converts in a corner of the classroom while class was being conducted.  
Each interview lasted from 30 minutes to 1 hour, depending on the detail of each 
respondent’s answers.  The respondents’ ages ranged from 19 to 57, with a mean of 34.7 
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and a median of 29.  There were 8 females and 5 males; 9 white, 3 Latina/o, and 1 non-
African American black.  All the subjects were Sunnis because I was not able o find any 
willing Shi’a or sufi converts.  I asked the converts 32 questions about their conversion 
experience.  These questions were based on other surveys of Muslim converts and my 
own hypotheses about US converts (particularly for the questions about race relations).  
During the interviews, I generally followed the question format except when t e convert 
explained things in a different order or something needed clarification.  The research for 
this paper has been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection 
of Human Subjects.  As per the IRB rules, I do not use in this paper any facts that can 
identify particular converts. 
 There were many limitations to this approach.  One set of limitations was due to
the population interviewed.  First of all, because all the converts I interviewed were 
Sunnis, I was not able to compare these results with the converts in non-Sunni groups.  
Furthermore, by only interviewing converts who were actively attending an Isl m course, 
I was limited to interviewing a certain kind of eager convert and not getting the full 
spectrum of personalities and views.  In addition, because the converts were being 
interviewed in a classroom where their fellow Muslims and teacher were ithin hearing 
range, they may have felt some need to censor their responses.  Also, as Lakhdaret al. 
noted in their study of French converts, what is recorded are reported convert motives, 
not actual motives, and so “distortions or reconstruction may have occurred.”146  Another 
limitation is that by only going to the central Sunni mosque I am not interviewing people 
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with other sectarian perspectives.  Additionally, as I noted in the introduction, by not
interviewing non-convert Muslims, I cannot determine exactly how the converts ar  
adapting the local Islamic culture.  Finally, by only interviewing 13 people, I have not 
obtained even the minimal requirement for a sample population for statistical analysis.  
With these things being said, I believe this paper can be still be seen as a case study and 
therefore a legitimate contribution to the study of US converts, though not necessarily 
representative of all US converts, and whatever findings I come up with can be 
reconciled with future studies.   
 
Microcontext 
 Of the 13 respondents, only 4 were originally from Colorado.  Two of these 4 
were those who converted prior to 9/11, both in the 1980s.  Three of the respondents 
grew up in 1 area and moved to Colorado as adults, however, 2 of those were immigrants 
to the US.  The 6 remaining respondents lived in more than one state or country due to 
various factors such as being in foster care, a military family, a migrant labor family, a 
family that separated, a family that moved for better opportunities, or a combination of 
these.  Having a significant change in one’s place of residence, then, is a theme for 8 out 
of the 13 converts.  For the remaining 5, only 3 have never lived outside of Colorado, and 
1 of those 3 travelled abroad for several months.  In the literature on conversion to Islam 
in the West, the theme of having multiple residencies is almost never mentioned.  At 
most, researchers might note whether their respondents are currently living in urban or 
rural areas, with urban being the most typical (the majority of converts in my stud , while 
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moving a lot, lived in primarily suburban environments).147  If a person has to continually 
readjust his or her life, and therefore his or her identity, because he or she moves to 
several different places, this might result in 1) being detached from a tradition l culture 
and 2) having a less stable identity—both of which are factors that have been noted as 
contributing to conversion.148  It is noteworthy that while changing residence is a likely 
factor in the conversion of my respondents, social class is not: 3 identified as “poor” 
growing up, 4 as “middle class to poor,” 3 as “middle class,” and 3 as “upper middle 
class.” 
 Education and occupation are factors that diverge from the findings of other 
Western converts.  Of my respondents, 3 had dropped out of secondary school, 3 were 
attending college courses at the time of the interview, and only 2 had a B.A. or equivalnt 
degree.  Carol Anway, who looked at female US converts, found that 53% of her 
respondents had a B.A. or higher, 12% had an M.A., 6% had an M.D. or PhD.  Anway’s 
results, however, are probably more revealing of her method for obtaining respons than 
of US female converts in general.  She sent out 350 questionnaires and only received 53 
back; those who took the time to write back were probably the better-educated who are 
more used to writing and filling out surveys.149  However, other researchers who did 1-
on-1 interviews with European subjects also saw higher levels of education: Zebiri noted 
that the converts’ education was generally above average150 and Köse reported that of his 
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subjects, 60% had at least a B.A. and 20% had graduate degrees.151  Similarly, Zebiri and 
Poston found that many of their subjects were professionals;152 while for my respondents, 
only 2 could be classified as having professional-type jobs, 2 worked construction-type 
jobs, 4 had clerical/service jobs, 2 were homemakers, and 2 were full-time students—
level of occupation was fairly evenly distributed.  I believe that the lower educational and 
occupational level of US converts as compared to their European (and, in the case of 
Poston, older American) counterparts should be seen in relation to the increased rate of 
conversion in the US.   Post-9/11 US conversion has probably been higher in the US than 
in Europe because: 1) the magnitude of the event itself, it is likely, had a significant 
impact on peoples’ minds, causing them to ask why the terrorists believed that Islam 
opposed US hegemony and what was it about Islam that propelled such unbelievable 
acts; 2) the discussions of 9/11 (and, hence, Islam) in the media have been more 
pervasive.  While converts in Europe are the relative elite whose education allows them 
to know more about a minority religion than the average person, US citizens of all classes 
have been exposed to information about Islam.  In addition, because Islam is usually 
spread by born Muslims, the increased rate of refugees to the US (which hosts almt 
twice as many as the United Kingdom) has meant that more “common” citizens are being 
exposed to Islam in the US than in Europe.153  The fact that, of my respondents, only 15% 
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had at least a B.A., which is about half the national average, indicates that Islam is 
actually more attractive to those with less education.154  This will be explored more later.  
 Another set of responses that differs from other studies’ findings is that of 
religious participation before conversion to Islam.  Five of the respondents were born 
Catholic, 1 Episcopalian, 1 Church of England, 2 Baptist, 2 non-denominational 
Christian, 1 Pentecostal, 1 Jewish (this person was raised Jewish and Christian, so both 
religions are counted), and 1 atheist.  Six of the respondents regularly attended church 
through at least high school, though 4 of those stopped attending soon after.  Four of the 
respondents attended religious services regularly until their early-to-mid teen years.  
Besides the person raised atheist, only 2 growing up had little religious participation.  
Often, the reason people gave for stopping their attendance of their original church was 
because they saw the membership and/or leadership of that church as being hypocritical, 
and not because they rejected all their former beliefs.  (Interestingly, those with r ligious 
backgrounds in Köse’s study gave similar explanations.)155  Of Zebiri’s subjects, 2/3 had 
a non-religious or nominal Christian background;156 85% of Köse’s respondents came 
from a family which did not identify with a church, and 51% said they had “no” or a 
“weak” religious upbringing;157 in Poston’s study, 57% were born Christians, but only 
32% had strong religious participation;158 conversely, in Anway’s study, only 2 said 
religion was not important in their formative years.159  The Pew Center found that the 
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majority of its converts came from Protestant backgrounds,160 though this can probably 
be attributed to the fact that the majority of its interviewed converts were African 
American, a group which overwhelmingly converts from Protestant denominations.161  
Additionally, their study did not record level of religious participation before conversion.  
The results of Zebiri and Köse, who both studied converts in England, can be seen as 
reflective of the overall lower rates of religious participation and belief in Europe.  
Poston’s results, on the other hand, might be connected to the fact that the subjects of his 
study, while American, did not convert at a time when many other people were 
converting to Islam, and they converted when Islam was a much less known religion, and 
therefore more threatening to someone who was raised in a religion.  Thus converts to 
Islam before the 1980’s (Poston looked at testimonials of people who converted between 
the 1940’s and 1980’s), as Poston’s results show, were probably less likely to have been 
connected to a particular religious denomination.  As Islam increasingly became more of 
a household word in the 1980’s due to world political events and increased immigration, 
more religious Americans felt comfortable to convert—and this is supported by Anway’s 
results which were based on questionnaires given in the early 1990’s.  My own findings 
confirm this trend as well.  Not only did the majority of my respondents come from 
backgrounds that included regular religious participation until at least their teen years, the 
families in which they lived were typically liberal in their views of other religions and 
races.162 
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 It is with childhood happiness that my results again correlate with those of other 
studies.  While some early scholars of conversion believed that family unhappiness 
growing up was a precondition for conversion, Köse refuted this.  Of his respondents, 
44% were happy, 26% moderate, and 30% unhappy.163  My own findings were similar: 
15% very happy, 55% happy/moderate, 15% unhappy, and 15% very unhappy.  Few of 
my respondents had problems with crime, drugs, or alcohol, and few went through 
particularly traumatic experiences.  In addition, like Köse’s subjects, some of th Denver 
converts had problems with their fathers.  Three of the respondents (23%) had fathers 
who were absent during a large part of their childhood, and 2 others (15%) had fathers 
who were frequently absent and with whom the respondents had a bad relationship.  
Twenty-six percent of Köse’s subjects had absent fathers, and 36% had passive and 
withdrawn fathers.164  Likewise, Roald reported that few of her subjects had poor 
relationships with their fathers.165  Köse suggests that absent or withdrawn fathers may 
“exacerbate the child’s perception of reality outside the home as unreliable,”166 and 
therefore may be a factor that motivates some to seek a “reliable” family in a new 
religion.  Generally, however, most converts to Islam in the West do not convert in 
teenage years (as will be discussed later), and this is probably reflectiv  of their high 
levels of happiness throughout childhood, even taking into account fathers’ absence.  The 
next sections examine how and why these people who have “happy” childhoods come to 
adapt a whole new religion and way of life. 
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SUMMARY: The Colorado converts differ from the other studied converts because they 
have generally moved more often and to more diverse places than their counterparts, they 
have less education, fewer of them have professional jobs, and they typically come from 
religious backgrounds.  I believe at least 2 factors account for these demographic 
differences: 1) the increased media attention given to Islam after 9/11 has exposed people 
to the religion who might not have had any other exposure because of their education 
levels and 2) increased immigration of Muslims to Colorado since the 1980’s has meant 
simply that more Coloradans of all types are meeting Muslims.  However, Colorado 
converts grew up with similar levels of happiness  
to their counterparts.   
 
Crisis 
 In 1965, Lofland and Stark wrote that tension is a predisposing condition for 
conversion.  They defined tension as “a felt discrepancy between some imaginary, ideal 
state of affairs and the circumstances in which these people saw themselves caught 
up.”167  Rambo agreed with this assessment and borrowed their definition for his second 
stage, “crisis.”  He believes that a crisis can take many forms: social, political, a process 
of self-exploration, or even in hearing a preaching of sins.168  Unfortunately, this is such a 
broad definition that it is hard to distinguish “crisis” from identity formation.  Even 
William James in 1902 remarked that a conversion which is due to a “sense of 
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incompleteness and imperfection; brooding, depression, morbid introspection, and sense 
of sin; anxiety about the hereafter; distress over doubts, and the like,” is still “in i s 
essence a normal adolescent phenomenon, incidental to the passage from the child's small 
universe to the wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity.”169  Nevertheless, looking 
at Köse’s findings, in the 2 years preceding conversion, 48.6% of his respondents said 
their lives were filled with distress.  Based on these authors, then, I believe that there is 
something to the idea of “crisis” preceding conversion, but Lofland and Stark’s definition 
is too broad to be helpful.  Instead, I look at whether the respondent indicated that they 
went through any stressful life change in the few years before conversion.  All but 2 
respondents indicated some type of stressful event. 
 Köse classified stress preceding conversion in 5 categories: 1) spiritual 
meaninglessness 48.6%; 2) interpersonal 27.1%; 3) character (drugs, temper) 18.6%; 
material (job, school) 11.4%; and physical 7.1%.170  I will slightly alter Köse’s categories 
to describe my respondents, and I want to point out that some people indicated more than 
one type of stressful event (these percentages are based on all 13 respondents): 1) 
spiritual confusion 23%; 2) interpersonal 38%; 3) character (drugs/alcohol, temper) 23%; 
4) material (job, school, incarceration) 15%; 5) physical 8%; 6) moved to a different city 
54%.  The fact that the Denver converts were not dealing with spiritual meaningless so 
much as spiritual confusion probably reflects the pervasiveness of religious belief in the 
US as compared to Europe, and so it can be assumed that spiritual meaninglessness is not 
as much an issue for Americans.  Similarly, while Zebiri, Roald, and Köse each said 
                                                          
169 William James, “Lecture IX—Conversion,” Varieties of Religious Experience, 
http://www.psychwww.com/psyrelig/james/james8.htm#205 (accessed February 18, 2009). 
170 Köse, Conversion, 86. 
54 
 
dissatisfaction with a Western, materialist culture was an important motivator to look for 
other sources of meaning, this factor was at best only hinted at by the Denver converts.171  
All the other results in my study (interpersonal, character, etc.) were comparable to 
Köse’s.  However, we again see that changing residence is an important theme for these 
Denver converts. 
 
SUMMARY: Colorado converts generally had similar stressful issues in the 2 years prior 
to conversion as their co-religionists in other studies: interpersonal, character 




 Rambo sees quest as a “process of building meaning” and purpose, and this is 
continually done by all people.  During times of crisis, however, this process is 
intensified.  Rambo suggests we look at 3 factors of the quest: response style, structural 
availability, and motivational structures.172  The first factor, response style, boils down to 
whether the convert played an active or passive role in his or her conversion.  Early work 
on converts asserted that they were mostly passive victims to proselytization techniques 
of sects, but this has increasingly been disproven, and is not supported by my findings.173   
 The Denver converts were very active in seeking out Islam.  As I will explain 
below, even when they had close relationships with Muslims who told them about the 
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religion, these Muslims never pressured the future converts to convert.  Structural 
availability, the second factor, looks at how individuals’ institutions let them try different 
activities.  This factor is more important for use in a broad historical perspective than in a 
specific time frame.  Most modern Western institutions (excluding the military, legal, and 
economic system, but including most religious groups), cannot prevent an individual 
from trying new things.  The final factor, motivational structures, deals with the main 
motivations leading to conversion.  These will be dealt with more in the next sections, but 
for now, suffice it to say that 54% of the Denver converts indicated that their conversi  
to Islam was based on spiritual reasons.   
 One of the most salient pieces of evidence that the Denver converts were active in 
seeking religion, and that they were free to choose a new religion (structural avail bility), 
is the fact that 7 of them (54%), before they converted to Islam, participated in religions 
other than those in which they were born.  Four of the 7 tried 1 other religion before 
converting to Islam, 1 person tried 2, 1 tried 4, and the other tried 10.  The religions they 
tried varied and no clear pattern emerges.  Two people tried Pentecostalism, 2 
participated in witchcraft, 2 had Masonic affiliations, 2 were at some point overtly 
atheist, and the other religions were only tried by one person each: Southern Baptist, 
Christian Science, Religious Science, Hinduism, Shamanism, Buddhism, yoga, 
Paganism, magic, Kabbalic practice, Catholicism, and Judaism.  What is interest g is 
that this “seeking” behavior is rarely seen in other studies of Western converts to Islam.  
Only 6 (20%) of Zebiri’s subjects chose Islam after looking at other religions;174 Köse 
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only classified 22% as “seekers,”175 and Anway does not give a number, but only a few 
of the subjects’ responses mentioned sampling other religions.176  Again, we can attribute 
the low findings in Zebiri and Köse’s work to the generally low religious participation in 
Europe.  And, my research shows that the converts with the weakest religious upbringing, 
like many in Europe, did not sample other religions.  Anway’s results are not as easy to 
understand.  Her respondents were all women, but from my research it appears that 
women tried other various religions about as often as men (for the Denver converts, 4 
women and 3 men tried different religions).  Anway’s respondents were also better 
educated, but in my results, the people with B.A.’s and the professionals all were 
“seekers.”  At this point, I cannot hypothesize as to why Anway’s results differed and I 
only hope that more research will shed light on this phenomenon.    
 
SUMMARY: Unlike their Western counterparts, the Colorado converts often partici ted 
in spiritual “seeking.”  This is probably due to the pervasiveness of religion in the US as 
compared to Europe. 
 
Encounter 
 Encounter, for Rambo, is looking at how people first learn about a religion.  
People are often introduced to new religions by advocates of that religion.  In fact, i  the 
history of conversion to Islam, the phenomenon of conversion without ever having met a 
Muslim face-to-face is extremely rare, though sometimes classes on religion or television 
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broadcasts do pique the interest of future converts.177  But in my particular study, just as 
in most others, converts’ interest in Islam usually came after meeting Muslims face-to-
face.  It should also be said, however, that people rarely convert immediately after their 
first encounter with Islam and sometimes people may go several years between their first 
encounter and feeling like they might want to convert.  Here, I will only evaluate first 
encounters as reported to me by the respondents when I asked them how they were first 
introduced to Islam.  None of the respondents said they were introduced to Islam by 
seeing it in the news media, though by living in the US, I think that would have been 
unavoidable especially as most of the respondents converted after 9/11.  I believe that the 
responses given to me indicated when the person began to actively learn details about 
Islam, even if this was not immediately followed by an interest in conversion. 
 Most of the Denver converts either did not know any Muslims growing up or 
never talked about Islam with a Muslim that they knew.  It was when they grew up and 
tried different things in their lives that these converts gained relationships with Muslims: 
3 of the respondents had made Muslim friends in the US, 4 were married to or dating a 
Muslim or person in the process of converting, 1 had a close family member who was in 
the process of converting, and 2 lived in Muslim countries where they made Muslim 
friends.  Of the remaining 3, 1 started reading about Islam on her own and 2 learned 
about it in college courses.  In Köse’s study, the first social contact with Islam was spread 
similarly: travel to another country 23%, conversation with a Muslim 37%, reading 
literature 23%, man-woman relationship 14%, and introduced by other family 3%.178  
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Nevertheless, one of Köse’s categories, that of man-woman relationship, appears to have 
a lower percentage than in the other studies.  One third of Zebiri’s converts were married 
to Muslim men at the time of conversion,179 Roald observed that most Scandinavian 
converts marry Muslim men before conversion,180 and Anway showed that 63% of her 
subjects married Muslim men before taking the s ahada as well.181  Zebiri and Anway 
both mention that women are usually introduced to Islam by their Muslim husbands who 
are usually only nominally Muslim and rarely pressure the women to convert.  The same 
can be said for the Denver converts who were in a relationship with a Muslim. 
 Throughout history, there has been little organized effort among Muslims to 
convert.  Even in Colorado and America in general, where Muslims have been 
increasingly organizing proselytization efforts and becoming involved with interfaith 
dialogues, on the whole, these efforts do not bring in many people.  Even converts to 
Christianity are less than 1% of all the people contacted by the Christian churches.182  
None of the Denver converts in this study indicated that they were introduced to Islam by 
a formal missionizing or interfaith effort.  The facts that in general Islam h s had no 
ecclesiastical body, no priests, no organized proselytization system, and that “calling” 
(da’wah) people to the faith is a repeated exhortation in the Qur’an183 led Thomas Walker 
Arnold to observe that the individual Muslim, because there is no intermediary between 
him or herself and God, “takes more trouble to learn the doctrines and observances of his 
faith, and thus becoming deeply impressed with the importance of them to himself, is 
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more likely to become an exponent of the missionary character of his creed in the 
presence of the unbeliever.”184  This is reflected in the percentage (77%) of the Denver 
converts who came to Islam only after talking with Muslims (as opposed to reading about 
it first).  Anway also observed that in the case of male nominal Muslims who take 
Christian wives in the US, it was not that they were not practicing Islam because they did 
not know it, but because they were separated from the social aspect of it—it is more 
difficult to practice Islam, which requires constant praying and rituals difficult to perform 
in non-Muslim countries (such as fasting during Ramadan), when you are living alone in 
a society that is not built around these things.185  Still, these men often held on to some 
Islamic ideas, and transmitted them to their significant others.  When the woman 
converted, the men usually increased their religious participation.  
 
SUMMARY: Most Western converts convert only after meeting Muslims face-to-face.  
However, compared to other studies, fewer Colorado converts were in a romantic 
relationship with a Muslim when they converted—several simply befriended Muslims.  
Moreover, the Colorado converts, like many Sunni converts throughout history, were not 
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 Rambo suggests that to study converts’ interaction with the new religion, we 
should look at 4 factors: relationships, rituals, rhetoric, and roles.186  What unites the 
converts in my particular study is that most of them started taking the “Beginnin  Islam” 
course at the mosque soon before or immediately after their conversion.  The majority of 
the converts had only known 1 or 2 Muslims before contacting the mosque.  When they 
did so, the mosque secretary generally referred them to the man who teaches the 
“Beginning Islam” course and he encouraged them to attend that class and a “Basic 
Arabic” course as well.  There, the converts interacted with other converts and developed 
a friendship with the teacher.  Most of the respondents attend both classes, Friday prayer, 
and other mosque gatherings.  Before the classes were offered (starting in 2000 at another 
mosque, and moving to CMS in 2004), small study circles were held in people’s houses 
and both of the respondents who converted before 9/11 participated in those study 
groups.  Anway also noted that her respondents generally all took part in ongoing 
study,187 and Poston noted that Islamic lessons were instrumental in 75% of the 
conversions he studied.188 
 Intellectual activities relating to Islam are generally popular among Western 
converts.  Thirteen out of 30 converts in Zebiri’s research said reading and religious 
debate was key to their conversion.189  Köse discovered that 71% of his subjects were 
motivated to convert because of intellectual reasons which they learned by reading m ny 
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books and talking to other Muslims.190  For the Denver converts, all but 1 indicated they 
did some Islamic reading before taking the shahada.  Most read general books on Islam, 
and 4 also read the Qur’an.  Overall, 8 of the Denver converts indicated that they were 
attracted to some sort of intellectual or theological aspect of Islam: 4 identif ed Islam’s 
congruence with science and logic, 2 appreciated its congruity with their former religion, 
and 2 liked that Islam did not have the contradictions of their old religion.  Here I should 
point out, however, that only the 4 who were attracted to Islam’s congruence with science 
and logic, were the ones who were primarily attracted to intellectual aspects of Islam.  
The others indicated that intellectual motivations were secondary to spiritual ones. 
 In general, the Denver converts indicated that the lifestyle change to Islam was 
not very difficult and reported that they had already been doing some of the things 
required by Islam.  All but 3 said their alcohol consumption was very low by the time 
they considered converting, and only 1 indicated that it took a few months to stop.  And 
all said it was relatively easy to give up pork products, some had even stopped eating 
pork long before conversion.  Köse found similar results: only 6 of his subjects continued 
to drink, and all gave up pork, as did Anway’s subjects.191   In the wearing of the hijab 
and long sleeves, all but 1 of the female converts do observe it all the time.  Three of the 
8 said it took a few months, sometimes longer, to wear it everywhere.  The workplace 
was where most were hesitant to wear it.  Only 1 of the men I talked to wore a long robe 
on a regular basis, and 1 other wore one intermittently, and these were the only 2 men 
with beards.  Anway found that only 2 of her respondents did not wear the hijab full 
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time,192 and Köse saw that while 30% of the women did not wear a scarf, 100% wore 
long sleeves and a high neck, 6% of the men donned robes, and 50% had beards.193  The 
Denver female converts I interviewed all felt that the this new kind of dress, along with 
the separation from men during prayer, were positive aspects of the religion because they 
helped people to avoid focusing on sexuality which they saw as a distraction from proper 
Muslim thinking.  Most of the Denver converts indicated that they try to do the 5 daily 
prayers and participate in Ramadan.  Forty-nine percent of Köse’s respondents di the 5 
daily prayers, while the other 51% believed they should, and 73% of his respondents did 
the full fast for Ramadan.194  Anway’s respondents all said they did the daily prayers and 
the full fast for Ramadan.195  In the study of Parisian converts by Lakhdar et al, 171 out 
of 191 said they pray on a regular basis, and 187 said they fast for Ramadan.196  Given 
the difficulty, as reported by the Denver converts, of finding a quiet and clean place to 
pray and a work environment that would allow it, it is hard to believe that the majority of 
the converts in the other studies regularly made all 5 daily prayers.  On the other hand, 
when it comes to using Islamic expressions, particularly “insha’allah” (“God willing”), 
this seems to be ubiquitous for Western converts.  
 Rambo suggests that rituals “provide integrative modes of identifying with and 
connecting to the new way of life.”197  They reinforce the values and lessons of the new 
religion, they distinguish the convert from the people not in the religion which solidifies 
the convert’s own identity, they validate the religion to other members of the religious 
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community, and they can help provide a spiritual experience for the person performing 
them.198  Arnold, in listing 6 reasons why Islam was successful, noted that the 5 daily 
prayers are a constant reminder of religion and community, as I believe are the abstinence 
from alcohol and park, the attending of prayer service and classes, the changeof dress, 
and the adding of Islamic expressions into ones speech.199  All these help to define the 
convert’s identity and role.   
 
SUMMARY: The converts in this study all participated in ongoing study of Islam, which 
is typical of Western converts.  Furthermore, intellectual factors played  role in their 
decisions to convert.  The Colorado converts, like their counterparts, found it relatively 
easy to follow the food and alcohol prohibitions of Islam.  The Colorado women mostly 
wore hijabs and long sleeves, like in other studies, but the men were far less likely to don 
Islamically-identifying clothing (like a beard or robe) than their counterparts.  Reported 
amounts of praying were also less for Colorado converts.  
 
Commitment 
 The level, kind, and time it takes to make a commitment required by a particular 
religion varies from religion to religion and from person to person.  In the case of th 
Denver converts, it took on average 3.9 years after first learning about Islam until they 
officially converted, but for some it took only 6 months and others up to 12 years.  And 
while study, rituals, and entering into a community were all important to the converts, 
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each had his or her own perception of what was the main attraction to Islam which 
culminated in conversion.  The converts were allowed to give multiple answers to what 
attracted them to Islam, and some people emphasized one factor over another.  The 
majority, 7, identified spiritual factors as the primary motive.  For them, Islam “felt” 
right, and these respondents usually indicated that while the intellectual aspects were 
important generally in their appreciation of Islam, their conversion was madebecause of 
non-intellectual motives.  Other responses indicated that people were attracted o Islam’s 
congruence with science and logic (4), its congruence with their former religion (2), the 
fact that it did not have contradictions like their former religion (2), its 
peacefulness/equality (3), and its discipline (1).200  Interestingly, European motives were 
primarily intellectual.  Almost half of Zebiri’s respondents, as I mentioned above, 
emphasized intellectual motives; Roald’s subjects mostly were attracted to Islam because 
it is a logical religion;201 Köse found that 47% thought Islam offered a better philosophy 
of life, and overall, 71% had intellectual motivations, while only 4% had mystical 
motives (not including Sufis).202  I believe that the higher rates of intellectual motives 
among Europeans are due to their being better educated and therefore more intellectually 
demanding of their new religion.  Roald has also observed that the things attractive o 
converts about Islam change over time and so it is possible that the relatively short time 
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my respondents have been Muslim, 1.7 years (excluding the 2 who converted before 
9/11), may play a part in shaping their response.      
 The average age at which the Denver converts took the shahada was 29.69, 28.6 
for men and 30.38 for women.  Poston found that the average age at conversion was 
31.4;203  Köse found the average age at conversion to be 29.7.204  While my findings 
correspond with those of Poston and Köse, it should be noted that the age at conversion 
found in the work of the Pew Research Center, Al-Qwidi, Zebiri, and Roald were all in 
their mid-20’s.205  Zebiri suggests that the reason for this difference is that these studies 
were conducted after 9/11, and because of the wide exposure Islam was getting in 
response to the attacks, more people were curious about the religion, which meant mor 
people were interested in converting and doing so faster than previous converts.206  While 
this probably does play a part, I believe that the composition of the sample group 
provides insight.  The first factor could be race: the Pew Center’s converts were 59% 
African American.  Nuri Tinaz showed that this group usually converts in their lower-to-
mid-20s, and those in the NOI convert most often in the 20 to 25 range,207 while the other 
studies discussed here looked at primarily white converts.  The second factor, as I 
touched on in Chapter 1, could be gender: Köse had a subject pool with more men than 
women while Roald and Zebiri had more female subjects than male (the gender of the 
                                                          
203 Poston, 166. 
204 Köse, Conversion, 37. 
205 Al-Qwidi: 25, cited in Zebiri, 43; Zebiri: 23.5 in Zebiri, 43. In a study by Roald, though she did not give 
an average age, she found that “(80%) were under 30” in Roald, 109; Pew: 49% converted under 21 in 
Pew, 22. 
206 Zebiri, 43. 
207 Tinaz, 268. 
66 
 
Pew Center converts was not reported).208  It is possible that European women generally 
convert at a younger age than men, though this would not be consistent with my findings.  
Early work on conversion found that the average age at conversion was 15, but 
contemporary works show that conversion is usually later,209 and is seen as a result of the 
process of creating a unified self in a modern world in which, because it is very complex, 
now takes longer than it did 100 years ago.  Erickson termed this the “moratorium” 
process and said that it generally ends in a person’s late 20’s.210  This “moratorium” 
appears to apply to Denver converts, but the very different results obtained by the Pew 
Research Center indicate that more work must be done to flesh out age distribution in 
terms of race. 
 Traditionally, the only ritual required to convert to Islam is the saying of the 
shahada (“There is not god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger”) in front of a 
Muslim witness.  Though occasionally there have been other requirements,211 today this 
is generally all that is required to officially convert.  Only 4 of the Denver converts took 
on a Muslim name, though none of them have changed it legally.  In England, Köse 
found that 81% took a Muslim name but only 6% legally changed it;212 and Jensen saw 
that “many” adopted new names, but these were “only seldom registered.”213  It is not 
clear as to why the Denver converts did not change their names as much as their 
                                                          
208 Köse, Conversion, 2: 50 men, 20 women; Zebiri, 9: 20 women, 10 men; Roald, 97: 58% women. 
209 Ali Köse, “Religious Conversion: Is It an Adolescent Phenomenon?  The Case of Native British 
Converts to Islam,” The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 6 (1996): 253-254. 
210 Köse, Conversion, 60. 
211 In Yemen’s history, converts have been required to eat “soup made from meat slaughtered according to 
Islamic law…”  Bat-Zion Eraqi Klorman, “Muslim Society as an Alternative: Jews Converting to Islam,” 
Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society 14 (2007): 101. 
212 Köse, Conversion, 128. 
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European counterparts.  Nonetheless, one post-conversion ritual that seems fairly 
consistent is Muslim marriage.  After converting, 5 Denver converts either married a 
Muslim or became engaged to 1.  One convert’s spouse ended up converting as well.  
Those who were already married, were married to Muslims, and those who were not 
married, indicated that they plan on marrying a Muslim, as has been the trend in other
studies.214  The percentage of Denver converts who were married to a Muslim before 
conversion (23%), however, is less than the percentages in the other studies,215 which is 
probably reflective of the increased popularity of Islam which may embolden people to 
convert even without solid social ties in the new religion. 
 
SUMMARY: Colorado converts took an average of 3.9 years from first learning about 
Islam to taking the shahada.  Their primary motivation was spiritual, unlike European 
converts whose main motives were intellectual.  However, Colorado converts converted 
at roughly the same age as their counterparts, 29.69 years, suggesting Erikson’s 
“moratorium” theory.  Nevertheless, unlike their counterparts, the Colorado converts 
were reluctant to change their names.    
 
Consequences 
 When a person converts to a new religion, especially one as stereotyped as Islam, 
the reactions of the extended family and friends can often times be difficult.  Eight of the 
Denver converts’ families had negative reactions at first, but over time most grew to 
                                                          
214 Zebiri, 224; Köse, Conversion, 80. 
215 63% in Anway, Daughters, 21; 58% in Roald, 97; 33% in Zebiri, 224; 57% in Köse, Conversion, 80. 
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accept it.  Often, there are some individuals in the extended family who continue to 
criticize the conversion or who completely disassociate from the convert.  Only 1 convert 
reported that the extended family was supportive from the beginning.  One convert has 
yet to tell the family, and others had waited several months after conversion.  Twice
when I asked about the reaction of friends and family, no mention was even made of the 
family.  Conversely, four of the converts had family members who also converted or are 
thinking about conversion.  Friendships with non-Muslims, however, are generally ended 
(9/13).  This is not usually the result of negative reactions from friends, but the fac  that 
the converts’ lives are so filled with Islamic activities and Muslim relationships, that they 
have no time for or see no purpose in maintaining friendships with non-Muslims.  Two 
converts did not even mention friendships with non-Muslims when asked, but 2 also said 
they still have good non-Muslim friendships.  These results correlate with those in oth r 
studies.  Anway found that 46% of her subjects’ families had negative reactions at first, 
but improved over time, 14% said their parents were supportive since day one, some were 
cut off from their family, and some said it was simply none of their parents’ business.216  
Köse reported that parents were extremely unhappy or hostile in 19% of the cases, 
indifferent in 31%, supportive in 14%, 24% had not seen their parents’ reactions 
(including the 11% who had not told their parents), and most friendships died out with 
hostility.217  Zebiri found that converts usually ended associations with non-Muslims.218  
In general, Western converts have decent relationships with their families and minimal 
relationships with non-Muslim friends. 
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SUMMARY: Like their counterparts, the Denver converts experienced negative reactions 
from their families immediately following their conversions, though their relationships 
improved over time.  Moreover, Denver converts followed the trend of ending most 
relationships with non-Muslim friends. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Denver converts share a few similarities and several differences with the 
converts in previous studies of non-African American groups.  As has been shown, while 
all Western converts tend to take the shahada in their mid-to-late 20’s, the education and 
occupations of the Denver converts are different from the others’.  In addition, Denver 
converts, in general, share the experiences of having moved several times before 
converting to Islam and having sampled other religions.  Also, on the whole, the Denver 
converts grew up more religious than their English counterparts.  These religious 
differences, then, can be at least partially attributed to the particular cultu e from which 
the converts come.  I believe that the other differences, especially education and 
occupation, are due to the pervasiveness of information about Islam in the media after 
9/11.  However, these 2 factors cannot alone account for conversion because it would be 
easy for the uneducated to criticize Islam given the pervasiveness of negative portrayals 
of Muslims in the media—so we must also note the other factors of these converts.  For 
instance, the experience of moving several times has made these particular individuals 
amenable to conversion.  It has been theorized for several years now that conver s are 
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generally marginal people,219 individuals “disconnected from the sources of power and 
support of the traditional culture.”220  Without being able to develop long lasting roots in 
a particular place, combined with being raised with a liberal (religious and racial) 
worldview, these particular converts were receptive to the message of universal unity in 
Islam.  The Denver mosque is also mostly populated by non-white Muslims, so this kind 
of egalitarian attitude would be a necessary precondition to convert.  I believe that the 
particular phenomenon of having moved several times, while it may not be unique to the 
Denver converts, is reflective of the fact that they generally have less ducation than their 
American predecessors and European counterparts.  This is because since information 
about Islam has permeated American life since 9/11, and therefore has reached the less
educated in a way that it has not before.  And since not all who have learned about Islam 
in the past 8 years have converted (in fact, anti-Muslim sentiment actually increased after 
9/11), I believe that those who converted did so at least in part because these were 
individuals who felt disconnected from their own sub-culture, though not the US/Western 
culture in general, which few of them overtly criticized (intellectual motives were not 
overwhelmingly important for the Denver converts).  Islam provided these converts with 
a way of unifying their pre-existing egalitarian views with their predisposition (because 
of their religious backgrounds) to “spiritual” experiences.  Furthermore, Islam w s also 
able to reconcile questions about the relationship of religion with logic, provide an 
alternative to the apparent contradictions in their former religion, or, altern tively, appear 
                                                          
219 In 1965, Lofland and Stark pointed out that while th majority of people in “contemporary society” 
found an outlet in their stress through psychiatric o  political alternatives, those who converted, for 
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220 Rambo, 41. 
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as congruent with the aspects of their former religion that they liked.  Islam’s power of 
unifying these ideas in a coherent sense of meaning has meant that, as Zebiri obs rved, 
individuals are attracted to this religion despite conversion to it having a perceived 
decline in social status.221   
 With these findings, we can test the hypotheses of other scholars.222  Based on his 
research, Köse proposed that there were 3 stages in the conversion of his subjects: 1) 
rejection of religion of origin, 2) getting acquainted with Muslims, and 3) experimenting 
with Islam, encouraged by intellectual motivations.223  This model essentially holds true 
for the Denver converts, though their religious backgrounds were stronger than those of 
Köse’s subjects, and intellectual motivations are not as important for the Denver 
converts.  The fact that Köse’s respondents were not “seekers,” however, led him to 
reject Lofland and Stark’s 7 step conversion model.224  But since several Denver converts 
were seekers, I believe the 7 step model applies.  Lofland and Stark believed that 
individuals had to meet increasingly narrow criteria in order to be able to convert.  These 
steps were “Tension,” similar to Rambo’s “crisis;” “Type of Problem-Solving 
Perspective” in which an individual chose between psychiatric, political, or religious 
outlets, and converts usually chose religious; “Seekership” in which individuals sampled 
different religions; “Turning Point” is a new crisis (e.g. “recent migration,” loss of 
employment, etc.) that immediately precedes conversion; “Cult of Affective Bonds” is an 
affective relationship developed between a convert and one or more members of the new 
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religion; “Extra-Cult Affective Bonds” were, in general, minimal or irrelevant for 
converts; and “Intensive Interaction” in which the convert performs a variety of the 
required rituals of the religion.225  Lofland and Stark’s model appears to apply to the 
majority of Denver converts.     
 Additionally, in his book, Rambo proposed several other hypotheses and 
encouraged their being tested.  While many could not be looked at because of the limits 
of this study, some of his hypotheses applied: “those who do not convert in a hostile 
setting are marginal members of society,” “consonance of core values and symbols will 
facilitate conversion,” and “converts selectively adopt and adapt the new religion to meet 
their needs.”226  Finally, I return to Arnold who made general conclusions about the 
success of Islam’s proselytization efforts over the centuries.  He attributed Islam’s 
success to: 1) Islam’s theological simplicity, which is easily grasped by people of all 
education, and holds at its core views that are already held by Christians and Jews (i.e., 
the oneness of God); 2) the fact that Islam is founded on rational principles; 3) the Hajj’s 
ability to constantly reinvigorate proselytizers; 4) the paying of alms supported and held 
together a feeling of community; 5) the many required prayers are constant remi ders to 
practitioners about their faith and the community in which they practice it; and 6) 
particular circumstances for each time and place.227  The power of numbers 1, 2, and 5 
have already been noted in this study, and the paying of alms (number 4) was also fairly 
consistent among the Denver converts.  On the other hand, pilgrimage to Mecca, as far s 
I know, has not played a strong role in energizing proselytizers, but in today’s age of
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worldwide instantaneous communication, and the emergence of several internet sis on 
Islam and da’wah in particular,228 I believe the Hajj is less necessary to motivate 
proselytizers than ever before.  Arnold’s final factor, number 6, should be identified as 
the post-9/11 world in the modern West with instant media communications and 
increased Muslim immigration.  Therefore, almost ironically, as long as “terrorist” is 
treated as synonymous with Arab and “Islam” thereby keeping the religion in the news, 
and Muslims continue to arrive in the US, it is likely conversion to Islam will 
proliferate.229   
 I would also like to suggest that these findings intimate 2 conclusions about Islam 
and religion in today’s US.  It would of course be irresponsible of me to make broad 
generalizations based on my findings of just 13 converts, so these propositions should be 
understood to be very tentative hypotheses and would require much extensive research.  
The first of these conclusions is that the increased amount and style of media attent on o 
Islam are changing how people view Islam and themselves.  In Imagined Communities, 
Benedict Anderson demonstrates that communities grow as individual people come to 
believe that others are in their community, and that this is heavily facilitated by media 
and its ability to reach a broad audience.230  The increased media attention to Islam 
following 9/11, whether positive or negative,231 has made more and more people aware of 
                                                          
228 Cesari, 111. 
229 Cesari, p. 41; also the consider the incident last year when Raed Jarrar was asked to cover his shirt 
which read, in Arabic script, “We will not be silent.”  David Elliot, “Bill offers redress to victims of 
terrorist watchlist,” February 4, 2009, 
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their fellow members of their community and thus in turn changed the way these people 
see each other.  (Its effects are of course augmented by increased Muslim immigration.)  I 
suggest that this change in Americans’ “imagined communities” has both fostered 
conversion for some, and reinforced discrimination for others.  This brings me to my 
other conclusion: the attention given to non-“traditional” (i.e., non-white Protestant 
Christian) groups in the media has changed the way people understand “religion.”  
Scholars have for the past 40 years now been exposing how the modern concept of 
“religion” was constructed by Protestants and with Protestant assumptions, implying that 
the things called “religions” do not necessarily conform to these assumptions;232 a d that 
“religion” is actually something that can connect and disconnect virtually any idea and 
experience.233  So, the increased exposure of “foreign religions” to people through the 
media introduces new ways of connecting ideas and experiences and ultimately of seeing 
oneself and one’s community.  I submit that because Islam and Muslims (particularly 
terrorists) are often presented, especially since 9/11, as irrational, “logic” plays less of a 
role in how Westerners perceive Islam.  This would at least partly explain the salient 
differences between the motivations and educational backgrounds of these Colorado 
Muslim converts and European and older American converts.   
 Finally, these conclusions bring to light areas that require further study.  What are 
the relationships between converts and their co-religionists in the mosque?  Do these 
converts attend other mosques?  What are the experiences of converts who do not attend 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Presented at Harvard Symposium Restless Searchlight, August 12, 2002.  For an example of “negative” 
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Islam classes?  What are the long-term patterns of the converts’ experience as Muslims?  
And more work should be done to see if the larger trends of female converts in the 
mosque—are they obtaining positions of power within the mosque?  Of course, none of 
these answers can be approached without conducting larger-scale studies in several ar as 
throughout the US.  This will be a difficult task as Muslims remain (somewhat 
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Questions for Converts 
 
 
What is your age, gender, and race or ethnicity? 
Can you describe the town(s) in which you grew up? 
How would you describe you socioeconomic class growing up? 
Can you describe your education growing up? 
Can you describe your levels of happiness growing up? 
Did you have any significant problems growing up? 
Can you describe your experience with religion growing up? 
What were your views on other religions? 
How would you describe your parents’ religious participation? 
What races did you interact with? 
What were your interests, hobbies, and lifestyle trends? 
Where you ever a member of any organizations outside of work and school? 
Where you ever involved in politics or political activism? 
Did you know any Muslims growing up? 
What were your views on Muslims growing up? 
Did you study or participate in religions other than the one you were raised with? 
What is your occupation now? 
Are you, have you been, or are you planning on being married? 
Do you have kids? 
 
Please describe your conversion experience.  [If information concerning any ofthe 
following questions is not brought forward in this description, I will ask that particular 
question.] 
How were you first introduced to Islam? 
What attracted you to Islam? 
What Islamic activities were/are the most important for you? 
Have you experienced any problems with other Muslims since you began learning about 
Islam? 
Would you characterize your conversion as “sudden”? 
After learning about Islam, how did your view of the world change? 
What about your view on US culture? 
Have any of your old relationships with non-Muslims changed (including at work)? 
Are you pursuing any new education? 
Have you had new romantic relationships with Muslims? 
What religious activities do you do (including reading religious texts and praying)?   
Which are regularly performed?  
 
Would you like to add anything? 
